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ABSTRACT 
 
  
 The objective of this study is to examine the association between goodwill and governance 
structures – specifically, potential agency conflicts and internal and external board monitoring 
mechanisms – over a four-year period (2004-2007). To do this, I perform two distinct analyses to test (1) 
whether governance structures appear to be determinants of aggregate goodwill, and (2) whether 
governance structures appear to moderate investors’ perceptions of aggregate goodwill. I then extend 
these tests to a sample of U.S. merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions where I calculate a more 
refined measure of residual goodwill and re-perform the tests using this alternative goodwill measure. I 
find that potential agency conflicts are associated with both goodwill and residual goodwill, whereas 
monitoring mechanisms appear to have little measureable association with either of the goodwill 
measures. In addition, I provide evidence that investors perceive goodwill balances less favorably when 
agency conflicts are high and limited evidence that their perceptions of goodwill improve when external 
monitoring is strong. Based on these findings, I conclude that governance structures should be considered 
when evaluating goodwill. My results also suggest that previous findings based on residual goodwill may 
need to be reevaluated. Specifically, my analyses highlight an important distinction between the purchase 
price and consideration elements of residual goodwill, and I propose future avenues of research which 
may be used to investigate this important distinction further. 
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“In many regards the market for corporate control is the ultimate governance 
mechanism. As managers compete in the product market, assets (companies) go to the 
highest value use and thus inefficient managers are disciplined. However, the market for 
corporate control may be double-edged in that it also provides a means by which 
inefficient managers may indulge in empire building through ill-advised acquisitions.” 
(Gillan 2006) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) are significant and complex corporate governance events in 
the lifecycle of the firm (Jensen 1993; Gillan 2006). M&A can dramatically alter the broad corporate 
landscape, affecting managers, employees, investors and all other stakeholders of the involved firms 
(Jensen 1993). Reflecting the significance of these important events, accounting for M&A is incredibly 
complex, involving significant use of valuation and estimates. In 2001, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) concurrently issued “SFAS 141: Business Combinations” and “SFAS 142: 
“Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets” in order to increase the comparability of reported M&A 
transactions and to provide higher quality accounting information on intangible assets, including goodwill 
(FASB 2001).1  
 Under the purchase accounting method required by SFAS 141, goodwill is allocated in M&A as 
the purchase price less all other separately identifiable assets (including intangible assets such as in-
process R&D, customer lists, and patents/trademarks). Thus, goodwill is clearly linked to a firm’s M&A 
activities. Although several accounting studies have investigated determinants and investors’ perceptions 
of goodwill (Chauvin and Hirschey 1994; McCarthy and Schneider 1995; Jennings et al. 1996; Henning 
et al. 2000; Bugeja and Gallery 2006), none of these studies consider the association between goodwill 
and key corporate governance factors – specifically, potential agency conflicts and the internal and 
external monitoring structures that arise in response to these agency conflicts. Goodwill is a unique 
account in that it can only be allocated through M&A and thus, goodwill balances may be associated with 
the many governance forces and mechanisms that interact in the context of a firm’s M&A activities. 
 The governance implications of business combinations have been well established in previous 
academic research. In theory, business combinations serve as an important corporate governance 
mechanism in maintaining efficient market economies (Jensen 1993). Successful acquisitions create value 
                                                 
1 FASB uses the term business combinations (also commonly used in the law literature), which is synonymous with 
M&A. Collectively, M&A may refer to any of three transactions pursued individually or in combination: (1) 
statutory mergers, (2) stock purchase transactions (including tender offers) and (3) asset purchase transactions. 
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for shareholders of both the acquiring and target firms by imposing discipline on corporate managers 
(Jensen 1993; Weisbach 1993; Andrade et al. 2001; Gillan 2006). Among the factors that contribute to 
these gains are improved operating performance through synergies achieved in the combined firm and 
superior returns resulting from greater economies of scale (Andrade et al. 2001; Haleblian et al. 2008). In 
fact, these synergies are thought to be a prime economic component of goodwill (Johnson and Petrone 
1998; Henning et al. 2000).  
 However, there is a significant and growing body of research suggesting that managers may 
engage in M&A for reasons other than shareholder value maximization, imposing significant costs on 
investors, employees, and numerous other stakeholders of the acquiring firm (Morck et al. 1990). Agency 
theory provides an explanation as to why managers will not always maximize shareholder value. When 
the functions of ownership and control are separated within the firm, managers are faced with 
opportunities to maximize their own personal utility to the detriment of the firm’s shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976).  
 To counteract potential agency conflicts, firms institute monitoring mechanisms meant to limit 
managerial power and protect shareholders. Accordingly, Dey (2008) finds that firms with high agency 
conflicts tend to implement stronger monitoring activities. Prior research also shows that monitoring 
mechanisms may impact M&A activities pursued by firm management by ensuring that only those 
acquisitions that maximize shareholder value are pursued (Byrd and Hickman 1992; Gillan 2006; Netter 
et al. 2009). Stronger monitoring may also lead managers to better integrate the operations of the newly 
acquired firm post-merger, further enhancing shareholder value. Overall, the interplay between agency 
conflicts and monitoring mechanisms may be reflected in M&A in two broad ways: (1) in the 
consummation of business combinations; and (2) in the post-acquisition integration activities and 
subsequent operating performance. In this study, I structure tests to examine how governance mechanisms 
and indicators of potential agency conflicts may affect M&A decisions and subsequent investors’ 
perceptions using goodwill as the focal point. Citing recent empirical works by Larcker et al (2007) and 
Dey (2008), I create three distinct measures; one capturing potential agency conflicts and two measuring 
the strength of monitoring mechanisms (internal and external) operating within the context of M&A. To 
do so, I perform principal component analysis (PCA) to capture the potential effects of numerous 
governance mechanisms and sources of agency conflicts affecting M&A decisions – and ultimately 
goodwill – within the 2004-07 sample period. After defining the measures, I test whether governance 
mechanisms and potential agency conflicts are determinants of aggregate goodwill. I next analyze 
investors’ perceptions of aggregate goodwill after splitting the sample firms into groupings based on their 
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governance and agency risk characteristics to examine whether investors’ perceptions vary depending on 
governance structures and underlying agency risks. 2 
 According to the work of Johnson and Petrone (1998) and empirical findings of Henning et al. 
(2000), aggregate goodwill balances might be better evaluated in separate elements. Henning et al. (2000) 
find that investors assign differential values to the various elements of goodwill. In their study, the 
authors break goodwill into four basic elements according to the framework of Johnson and Petrone 
(1998). These four elements are: (1) the ability to earn a higher return on a collection of assets than would 
be expected if those assets were acquired separately (going-concern element); (2) the fair value of 
synergies obtained by combining the acquirer’s and target’s assets and operations (synergy element); (3) 
payments resulting from over- or under-valuation of the consideration used in the acquisition 
(consideration element); and (4) purchase premiums paid (or discounts obtained) in the course of 
acquisition negotiations (purchase price element). Under SFAS 141, goodwill balances may include all 
four elements; however some could argue that the consideration and purchase price elements do not imply 
future economic value for the acquiring firm. Henning et al. (2000) provide some support for this 
argument, providing evidence that investors value the synergy and going concern components of goodwill 
and discounting the residual goodwill components (e.g., residual goodwill is negatively associated with a 
firm’s market valuation).  
 I adopt this more refined approach to goodwill measurement and re-perform the previous tests 
using these more refined residual goodwill measures. Following prior research, I employ two different 
residual goodwill measures. The first follows the methodology of Johnson and Petrone (1998) and 
Henning et al. (2000), which I outline above. The second measure follows the methodology outlined in 
Shalev (2009), using the residuals from a regression of the ratio of allocated goodwill over the total 
purchase price on three variables : (1) target firm industry classification;  (2) acquiring firm industry 
classification; and (3) a measure of acquiring firm growth prospects. Calculating these residual goodwill 
measures requires hand-collected, transaction-level data and thus, my sample is constrained to a subset of 
the full sample of firms comprising my initial tests.3 
                                                 
2  An important limitation of the aggregate goodwill tests I perform is that aggregate goodwill balances may be 
allocated prior to the sample period and therefore, may not correspond with the governance variables I capture 
during the four-year sample period. Further, aggregate goodwill serves as a noisy measure of a firm’s prior 
acquisition activity. The aggregate goodwill balances may include goodwill balances allocated prior to the passage 
of SFAS 141 (and thus subject to amortization prior to 2001) as well as goodwill allocated in M&A involving 
foreign entities. In these cases, it is likely that the determinants and perceptions of the corresponding goodwill 
balances differ, which may be impacting the aggregate goodwill analyses I perform. See additional discussion in 
Section 7.A. 
3 In order to avoid complications arising from foreign currency exchange rate fluctuations I specifically exclude 
foreign firms and acquisitions from these analyses, as is implied in the title of the paper. However, I acknowledge 
that aggregate goodwill balances may include balances allocated in M&A transactions involving foreign firms. 
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 Overall, this study should illustrate the role of governance structures in the incidence and 
reporting of M&A transactions and the allocation of goodwill in these transactions. Further, the study 
should help to assess whether goodwill balances provide useful information to market participants for 
valuing firms in M&A events, while considering the effects of a firm’s governance environment. M&A 
transactions are significant business events, and accurate accounting for these transactions is crucial for 
interpreting the merits and/or potential pitfalls of these transactions. If the reported accounting 
information is not accurate, investors and other users of financial statements may not be able to 
reasonably assess the risks associated with these transactions.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I provide a literature review and 
discuss the relevant theories that pertain to the study. Hypotheses are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, 
I describe the empirical analyses including model specification, sample selection, summary statistics and 
the construction of the governance variables. Results of the primary hypotheses tests are presented in 
Section 5 and additional tests are described in Section 6. I conclude with Section 7, in which I discuss the 
study’s primary implications and limitations, and synthesize future related research avenues. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. M&A: two illustrative examples 
i. The case of Microsoft and Yahoo! 
 On January 31, 2008, Microsoft shocked Wall Street with the announcement of a proposed $41+ 
billion offer to acquire the beleaguered Internet giant, Yahoo!. Investors responded with enthusiasm, 
quickly bidding Yahoo’s stock up nearly 50 percent on extremely heavy volume.4 However, Yahoo! 
executives quickly rebuffed the offer reportedly stating that Microsoft’s offer “substantially undervalues 
Yahoo!” (Delaney et al. 2008).5 Microsoft quickly responded with a revised $47.5 billion offer in order to 
“secure the goodwill of Yahoo! staff and management” (Delaney et al. 2008). However, this offer was 
similarly rejected and the transaction ultimately fell through. An article in the San Francisco Chronicle 
dated November 8, 2008 quotes Microsoft CEO, Steve Ballmer, on the topic of the failed bid. He 
comments, “[w]e made an offer, we made another offer, and it was clear that Yahoo! didn’t want to sell 
the business to us and we moved on.” However, the article acknowledges that Yahoo! CEO, Jerry Yang, 
“is open to a takeover and even went so far as to suggest that Microsoft should make an offer” (Kopytoff 
2008). Yang has since been ousted as CEO and the investing world waits to see whether Microsoft will 
again bid for Yahoo! with the firm’s powerful founding CEO no longer at the helm (Waters and Nuttall 
2008).6 
 Although this proposed M&A transaction was never consummated, this widely publicized bid 
involving two technology giants highlights several fascinating aspects of M&A activity. First, M&A 
reflect the culmination of often lengthy negotiations and represent the interests of multiple parties and 
persons. Second, they reflect trends in the current business environment, characteristics of both the target 
and acquiring firms, as well as those of the managers, board members, and significant investors involved 
throughout the lengthy merger process. Third, these corporate events reflect the operation of several 
critical corporate governance mechanisms at work to determine whether a merger bid is ultimately 
accepted and at what price. I elaborate on these important theories, motivations and related governance 
                                                 
4 Stock opened at $28.68 on 2/1/98 from a previous closing price of $19.18 according to Yahoo historical stock 
prices obtained from Yahoo finance (http://finance.yahoo.com) 
5 Yahoo executives were reportedly holding out for at least $40/share, which would value the transaction upwards of 
$57.5 billion. In a press release, Yahoo stated that Microsoft’s offer undervalued its “global brand, large world-wide 
audience, significant recent investments in advertising platforms and future growth prospects, free cash flow and 
earnings potential[.]”(Delaney et al. 2008) 
6 The article also reports on the changing dynamics of Yahoo’s board of directors following the appointment of a 
prominent activist shareholder, Carl Icahn, to the Board. Icahn had long been a vocal critic of Yahoo’s former 
executive, Jerry Yang (Waters and Nuttall 2008). 
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mechanisms in section 2.B below. Before doing so, I present a second illustrative example to further 
frame and motivate the study. 
 
ii. The case of WorldCom 
 In July of 2002, the once high-flying telecom company, WorldCom, Inc., filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection.7 A key area of interest during the bankruptcy proceedings was WorldCom’s M&A 
history and activity. The court-appointed Examiner (Dick Thornburgh) paid considerable attention to the 
firm’s accounting for M&A to determine “[w]hether WorldCom, in addition to using acquisition reserves 
in a “cookie jar” fashion, might, without sufficient justification, have reduced the book value of the 
tangible assets of some of the companies that it acquired, including MCI, while commensurately 
increasing the amount allocated to goodwill (Thornburgh 2002, 2003).” These allegations, if true, suggest 
that WorldCom’s CEO, Bernie Ebbers, may have pursued value-decreasing M&A transactions 
opportunistically in order to engage in “empire building.”8 Furthermore, this M&A activity may have 
been used to conceal an ongoing fraud perpetrated by key executives by propping up accounting earnings 
by improperly increasing the amount of goodwill allocated in business combinations. 
 WorldCom’s case is a rare and extreme example of the financial reporting risks inherent in M&A 
accounting, but it illustrates several important points related to M&A. First, WorldCom’s management 
apparently pursued M&A for reasons other than to maximize shareholder value. Second, the board of 
directors seemingly failed to adequately monitor the firm’s management team with respect to M&A 
activity, suggesting a failure in WorldCom’s internal governance mechanisms. Third, the financial 
reporting of WorldCom’s M&A activities may have been manipulated to manage future earnings upwards 
by understating acquired identifiable assets and overstating the amounts allocated to goodwill.  
 Clearly, business combinations are complex, newsworthy, and potentially controversial events. 
There has been a considerable stream of literature devoted to these important corporate transactions and a 
number of theories for M&A have emerged, most notably in the finance area. However, it is surprising 
that there has been relatively little research on the topic of M&A performed by accounting scholars. 
Accounting for M&A is as complex and controversial as the transactions themselves and therefore 
thoughtful accounting research on the subject is both necessary and desirable. However, no research on  
                                                 
7 WorldCom’s bankruptcy filing, at the time, was the largest Ch. 11 bankruptcy filing in U.S. history. Lehman 
Brothers has since claimed this dubious distinction when it filed for Ch. 11 protection in September 2008. 
8 The term “empire building” is used by Gillan (2006) and is meant to illustrate a theory of managerial behavior, 
where executives may pursue M&A in an effort to bring more assets under their control rather than for 
maximization of shareholder value. 
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the subject of M&A can be completed without considering the economic theories which underlie the 
transactions themselves, which I address next. 
 
B. M&A: background & theory 
i. Background: why do firms engage in M&A? 
 Mergers and acquisitions are significant corporate events which can have a profound effect on the 
corporate landscape (Jensen 1993). Given the importance of these events, there are several proposed 
theories and rationales that attempt to explain why firms and their management teams engage in M&A. I 
begin my theoretical development with a survey of the reasons why firms (and their respective 
management teams) may engage in M&A. 
 A literature review by Andrade et al. (2001) is a good starting point. In their paper, the authors 
classify the underlying motivations for M&A into five categories: (1) efficiency related reasons; (2) 
attempts to create market power; (3) fulfilling the self-serving interests of managers; (4) market 
discipline; and (5) taking advantage of opportunities for diversification.9 The authors acknowledge that 
some M&A may not be pursued with the shareholders’ best interests at heart. “We would like to believe 
that in an efficient economy, there would be a direct link between causes and effects, that mergers would 
happen for the right reasons, and that their effects would be, on average, as expected by the parties during 
negotiations. However, the fact that mergers do not seem to benefit acquirers provides reason to worry 
about this analysis.” (Andrade et al. 2001) 
 Morck et al. (1990) provides empirical evidence that would support this observation, finding that 
announcement period returns are significantly lower when firms engage in diversifying M&A, acquire 
rapidly growing firms, and when its managers perform poorly prior to the M&A transactions. The authors 
conclude that this evidence serves as strong evidence that managers may pursue M&A for self-serving 
reasons. Of the five M&A motivations listed above, only the third item (self-serving managerial interests) 
would explain this empirical observation that M&A, on average, do not appear to benefit shareholders of 
the acquiring firm.  
 Prior research has also identified five different scenarios in which self-serving managerial 
interests may impact a firm’s M&A decisions. First, managerial hubris predicts that managers may 
overpay in M&A because they overestimate their own ability to derive synergies in the combined 
company (Roll 1986). Masulis et al. (2007) provide evidence that poor M&A may be associated with 
increasing managerial power (or entrenchment). In a sample of more than 3,000 M&A transactions 
                                                 
9 I note that this list is not exhaustive. For instance, managers may also pursue M&A in connection with a firm’s 
organizational tax strategies.  
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between 1990 and 2003, the authors find that acquiring firms with potentially entrenched managers (those 
firms with significant anti-takeover provisions, operating in less competitive industries, and holding dual 
CEO/Chairman positions) see significantly lower announcement-period returns.  
 Second, managers may desire to grow the firm beyond reasonable levels, a practice which has 
been referred to as “empire building” (Gillan 2006). Empire building may allow managers to increase 
their notoriety or to secure higher compensation as more assets are acquired and placed under their 
control. In a disclosure setting, Hope and Thomas (2008) provide evidence that the quality of foreign 
operations’ disclosure varies inversely with growth in foreign revenues. The authors deem this as proof of 
empire building, suggesting that managers who engage in aggressive expansion through M&A into 
foreign markets are less transparent in disclosing the related operating activities in order to avoid scrutiny 
for making ill-advised M&A decisions.  
 Third, managers may engage in M&A in order to collect M&A bonuses and equity payouts 
directly related to a completed M&A transaction. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) provide evidence that 
M&A bonuses are more prevalent at firms where CEOs hold considerable power. Further, they show that 
more powerful CEOs acquire larger firms, receive higher M&A bonuses as a result, and that the market 
responds more negatively to the corresponding merger announcements.  
 Fourth, the agency costs of free cash flow theory (Jensen 1986) predicts that managers in control 
of large free cash flows may also be more likely to pursue ill-advised M&A. Harford (1999) provides a 
direct test of this theory using a large sample of attempted M&A transactions between 1977 and 1993. 
The author presents strong evidence, measured in both stock returns and operating performance, that cash 
rich firms are more likely to engage in value-decreasing M&A. 
 And fifth, managers may engage in low quality M&A as part of a broader effort to conceal or 
perpetrate earnings management or fraud. A prime example of this is WorldCom, whose management 
perpetrated one of the largest frauds in U.S. history. In the bankruptcy proceedings, the firm’s examiner 
specifically describes a pattern of M&A activity that should have raised red flags with investors, auditors 
and regulators (Thornburgh 2002, 2003). Empirically, both Heron and Lie (2002) and Louis (2004) 
examine operating performance for the acquiring firm in the time period preceding a M&A transaction to 
test whether there is evidence of earnings management. These studies yield mixed results as Heron and 
Lie (2002) find no evidence of earnings management while Louis (2004) documents strong evidence that 
acquiring firms may manage pre-M&A operating performance to boost stock prices ahead of a M&A 
transaction in which the acquiring firm issues equity.  
 All of these examples of self-serving managerial interest build on theoretical underpinnings 
widely known as the agency problem. Specifically, they imply a scenario in which managers wield 
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considerable power in the decision making process, with little effective monitoring oversight. The relation 
between the agency problem, monitoring and M&A has been extensively studied, predominantly in the 
finance literature. Accordingly, I would be remiss to begin any theoretical examination of M&A without 
first discussing the implications of agency theory and monitoring.  
 
ii. Theory: the agency problem in M&A 
 According to agency theory, the separation of ownership and control creates opportunities for 
corporate managers to extract benefits from the firm thereby increasing their own personal utility by 
acting in ways that may not be in the best interests of the firms’ shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). This paradox is widely recognized as the “agency problem” and it creates a demand for corporate 
governance, giving rise to a number of the mechanisms outlined by Gillan (2006) in his paper. All of the 
mechanisms entail some economic cost to the firm, or agency costs, which are those incurred to ensure 
managers act in the best interests of their firms’ shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980).  
 The agency problem manifests itself in two ways with respect to business combinations, 
representing the double-edged sword described in earlier published studies (Bittlingmayer 2000; Gillan 
2006). “On the one hand, it allows managers to indulge their penchant for acquiring businesses they are 
not able to manage well and to pay too much when they do so, but, on the other hand, it also provides the 
ultimate corrective” (Bittlingmayer 2000). That is, managers with too much power may pursue value-
decreasing M&A to the detriment of their firms’ shareholders. Thus, it is important that firms implement 
effective governance mechanisms to monitor and limit managerial power in order to protect the interests 
of the respective shareholders. 
 
iii. Theory: internal governance mechanisms in M&A 
 Gillan (2006) proposes a governance framework that includes five broadly defined categories of 
internal monitoring mechanisms: (1) board of directors, (2) managerial incentives, (3) capital structure, 
(4) bylaw and charter provisions, and (5) internal control systems. This framework illustrates the interplay 
between potential sources of agency conflict and monitoring mechanisms within the firm. Several 
different studies have empirically examined these important governance structures within the context of 
M&A. 
 Focusing first on the board of directors, Byrd and Hickman (1992) examine 128 tender offer bids 
made from 1980 through 1987 and find evidence of higher announcement-date abnormal returns for firms 
possessing greater board independence, suggesting that strong independent board monitoring leads to 
better M&A. Prior research has also shown an association between target firm board characteristics and 
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the likelihood of a hostile takeover (Shivdasani 1993; Weisbach 1993). The authors conclude that poor 
monitoring by the target’s board of directors leads to an increased incidence of a hostile takeover event, 
using variables such as independence, board stock ownership, and other corporate directorships to 
measure the quality of a board’s monitoring activities. However, several recent studies have extended 
these findings by analyzing CEO involvement in the selection of directors. These studies find that CEO 
involvement in the director selection process limits the effectiveness of boards in fulfilling their 
monitoring responsibilities (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999; Carcello et al. 2010).10 In all, the board 
fulfills an important role in monitoring and ratifying management decisions and to the extent this 
important mechanism is compromised, managers may misuse their power and influence to the detriment 
of the firm’s shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983; Gillan 2006). 
 Managerial incentives also play an important role in reducing agency conflicts. According to 
Gillan (2006), managerial incentives fall into three categories including (a) ownership, (b) compensation, 
and (c) employment agreements. Considering the ownership component, Datta et al. (2001) find that 
managers compensated more heavily with equity-based compensation tend to make better M&A decisions 
overall. However, there has been evidence that would suggest that managerial ownership cannot be 
viewed monotonically, giving rise to a theory known as managerial entrenchment (Morck et al. 1988). 
The theory posits that managers may become “entrenched” when the important internal governance 
mechanisms meant to regulate their behavior are ineffective (Morck et al. 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 
1989).11 Morck et al. (1988) document a non-monotonic association between managerial shareholdings 
and a measure of firm valuation (Tobin’s Q). Managerial shareholdings lead to higher firm value in cases 
when they are low (e.g. below five percent) or relatively high (e.g. above 25 percent). However, the 
findings imply that managerial entrenchment occurs between five percent and twenty-five percent 
ownership and that incentive alignment does not occur unless managers hold considerable percentages of 
the firm’s stock. 
 Managerial compensation is also a key element for aligning the incentives of managers and the 
firm’s shareholders. There have been a number of studies examining the impact of managerial 
compensation on M&A activity. Harford and Li (2007) find that CEOs tend to receive higher total 
compensation after undertaking a business combination and that this association is insensitive to stock 
                                                 
10 Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) examine stock price reactions around the announcement of new director 
appointments and find significantly lower stock returns persist when the CEO is involved in the selection process.  
In a related study, Carcello et al. (2010) provide evidence that CEO involvement in the selection of board members 
who also serve on the firm’s audit committee is associated with diminished financial reporting quality. 
11 Factors contributing to entrenchment include, but are not limited to, significant managerial shareholdings, weak 
board monitoring, strong anti-takeover provisions, CEO/Chair duality, and having a CEO who is also founder of the 
firm. 
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returns and shareholder wealth. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) show that more powerful CEOs (e.g. those 
holding seats on the nominating committee or those holding dual CEO and chair positions) receive 
significantly higher M&A bonuses. Further, the authors provide evidence that these bonuses are not 
sensitive to deal performance and that more powerful CEOs tend to engage in relatively larger M&A 
transactions to the detriment of the firm’s shareholders. Finally, Datta et al. (2001) find that managers 
who receive considerable equity-based compensation tend to make better M&A decisions overall. 
Specifically, the authors document a high association between equity-based compensation and stock price 
performance around the M&A transaction announcement date. The evidence they provide also suggests 
that managers receiving higher equity-based compensation pay lower M&A premiums, acquire firms with 
greater growth potential, and engage in M&A that increase firm risk, coinciding with the increased 
opportunities for increased returns. It is important to note that compensation agreements may not always 
lead managers to act in the shareholders’ best interest. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) acknowledge that 
managerial compensation arrangements can, themselves, be compromised by managerial power and so it 
is important to consider that compensation incentives may not always lead managers to engage in value-
increasing M&A. 
 Employment agreements can also be used to ensure managers act with shareholders’ interests in 
mind through the threat of termination due to poor performance. Lehn and Zhao (2006) find that 47 
percent of acquiring firm CEOs are replaced within five years of the M&A event. Furthermore, the 
authors find evidence of a strong negative association between acquiring firm returns and the likelihood 
of CEO turnover. Overall, their study shows internal governance mechanisms may work to protect 
shareholders by removing managers who pursue ill-advised M&A. 
 Capital structure is a term that describes the overall financing structure of the firm as a mix of 
equity and debt. The agency costs free cash flow theory describes the important agency implications of 
free cash flow in managerial decision making. Free cash flow is defined as cash which accumulates in a 
firm that has no other viable positive net present value projects. When confronted with free cash flow, 
managers are more likely to invest in value-decreasing projects, which include M&A investments (Jensen 
1986). Jensen illustrates how debt may be used to limit the agency conflicts associated with free cash 
flow. When a firm issues debt in exchange for stock, they replace voluntary dividend payments with 
contractual interest payments and thus reduce the levels of free cash flow. Maloney et al. (1993) provide 
empirical support for this theory documenting a positive association between leverage and abnormal 
returns for acquiring firms. Other studies have included leverage as a control variable when studying 
M&A for both the target (Moeller 2005; Wang and Xie 2009) and the acquiring firms (Harford 1999; 
Moeller et al. 2004; Masulis et al. 2007; Wang and Xie 2009). Surprisingly, none of these studies 
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document a significant association between leverage and the measure of M&A performance (typically 
announcement-period returns or transaction premiums paid). 
 Bylaw and charter provisions, such as anti-takeover mechanisms (e.g. “poison pills”), have been 
shown to significantly impact the level of a firm’s M&A activity. Brickley et al. (1994) are among the 
first to examine the impact of anti-takeover measures on firm performance and management behavior. 
The authors provide evidence of a positive stock-market reaction to the adoption of poison pills when a 
board has an independent board and a negative stock-market reaction when the board is not independent. 
Thus, anti-takeover measures are clearly viewed to be valuable when they are perceived to serve the 
interests of shareholders rather than as a mechanism to further entrench the firm’s management against 
outside takeover bids. Masulis et al. (2007) provide compelling evidence that acquiring firms with 
predominant anti-takeover provisions tend to experience significantly lower announcement period 
abnormal stock returns as compared to acquiring firms with few (if any) anti-takeover measures. The 
authors conclude that the presence of anti-takeover provisions may provide a signal of possible empire 
building, which is widely viewed as detrimental to shareholders. Finally, Wang and Xie (2009) find that 
there is a corporate governance transfer effect in M&A. In other words, the wider the gap in shareholder 
rights between the acquiring and target firm (stronger rights at acquiring firms relative to the target firms’ 
shareholder rights), the greater the abnormal announcement-period stock returns. 
 Finally, internal control systems are important monitoring mechanisms which have received 
considerable attention recently. The passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 requires firms and 
their auditors to identify any internal control deficiencies and separately opine on the quality of the firm’s 
overall internal control structures. Although internal audit costs and structures cannot be readily accessed 
through public sources for ex ante analysis, several researchers have used the newly available internal 
controls data to perform ex post governance research on this important mechanism.12,13 
 
iv. Theory: The role of M&A as an external governance mechanism 
 External governance mechanisms may also work to reduce the agency problem of the firm. In the 
following sections, I discuss several of the relevant external governance mechanisms. Gillan (2006) 
presents five broad categories of external governance mechanisms: (1) law/regulation, (2) markets, (3) 
capital market information/analysis, (4) accounting, financial and legal services, and (5) private sources of 
                                                 
12 Studies include Doyle et al. (2007a; 2007b), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007; 2008), and Hogan and Wilkins (2008). 
13 An effective set of internal controls may also have an effect on M&A decisions and post-merger integration 
activities. As a result, internal controls could impact the initial allocation of goodwill and subsequent investors’ 
perceptions of this asset. Though not the focal point of my study, I perform limited analyses regarding the 
association between internal controls and goodwill in Section 6 below. 
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external oversight. Within the context of M&A, I focus on three of these categories for further discussion: 
markets, accounting services, and law/regulation.14  
 M&A transactions, themselves, reflect a market known as the market for corporate control. 
Jensen (1993) concludes that M&A serve as a relatively efficient measure as compared to other external 
“control forces” (such as legal, political, and regulatory systems or the product markets) when it comes to 
disciplining inefficient managers. However, he notes that M&A should be relied upon only as a last resort 
when a firm’s internal control systems and other more efficient external mechanisms have failed. Product 
and labor markets are two such mechanisms. Jensen (1993) suggests that takeover targets are typically 
firms that have lost their competitive edge in providing goods and services to their customers. Ultimately, 
firms that cannot compete in the product markets will either dissolve, be forced into bankruptcy, or 
become takeover targets to more successful competitors.  
 Labor markets reward more competent managers and directors with more prestigious 
appointments and higher salaries while punishing ineffective managers and directors through termination. 
Lehn and Zhao (2006) find that CEOs who pursue takeovers that are poorly received by investors are 
more likely to be terminated in the months following the M&A transaction. Harford (2003) finds that 
directors of the target firm are punished in the labor markets as a result of the takeover event in that they 
hold fewer board seats and have lower future board compensation after a successful bid. These studies 
provide empirical evidence of the role that labor markets play in M&A. 
 Another markets category is the capital markets category. Capital markets are made up of either 
debt or equity holders, with the equity holders being the most pertinent to M&A. Specifically, Gillan 
(2006) identifies the presence of institutional shareholders and blockholders to be of particular importance 
from a governance standpoint. The reason for this is clear; significant stakeholders in the firm actively 
monitor management because they have a significant economic interest in the firm. Both Dey (2008) and 
Larcker (2007) show the existence of significant institutional or other outside blockholders to be vital 
mechanisms for monitoring management. Furthermore, a diffuse ownership structure (e.g., no 
institutional or outside blockholders) is widely believed to contribute to the agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Chen et al. 2007; Dey 2008). 
 Accounting service providers, particularly a firm’s auditors, serve as watchdogs commissioned 
with the responsibility of providing an independent outsider’s opinion on the financial statements, 
including the reporting of M&A activity. Louis (2005) finds that acquiring firms with non-Big N auditors  
                                                 
14 Gillan (2006) further classifies markets into four sub-categories: (1) capital markets, (2) market for corporate 
control, (3) labor markets, and (4) product markets. Given the scope of the market for corporate control, I devote 
most of the discussion of external markets to this important topic. 
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outperform those with Big N audit firms. He interprets these results as evidence that non-Big N audit 
firms offer a comparative advantage in assisting their clients in the implementation of a M&A transaction. 
There has been an entire stream of accounting literature devoted to audit quality differences between Big 
N and non-Big N audit firms, with the consensus view being that Big N auditors offer higher quality 
audits than do small- and mid-sized audit firms.15 
 Finally, laws and regulation may serve as an effective – albeit inefficient – monitoring 
mechanism (Jensen 1993). The passage of SOX, the sweeping regulatory and legal response to a swath of 
corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, is a prime example. Accounting standard setters may also change 
the monitoring landscape through the passage of new accounting standards and/or disclosure 
requirements. For instance, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued SFAS141 in 2001 
with the stated goals of improving the comparability and representational faithfulness of reported 
financial information (FASB 2001). This standard superseded Accounting Principles Board (APB) 
Opinion No.16: Accounting for Business Combinations, which had allowed either the purchase or the 
pooling-of-interests method of accounting for business combinations. SFAS 141 requires the purchase 
method of accounting for M&A activity, no longer giving firms an option between the two methods of 
accounting for M&A.16   
 Under the pooling-of-interests method, an equity-only transaction is considered to be a 
rearrangement of ownership interest and the assets of the target and acquiring firm are combined at book 
value (Libby et al. 1998). As such, no fair value estimates are required, eliminating a significant area of 
management judgment and estimation in the reporting of M&A transactions. Though FASB has removed 
considerable complexity in requiring a single accounting method for business combinations, application 
of the purchase method is itself complex and technical. Accounting for business combinations requires 
significant management judgments and estimates, thereby leading to an increased risk of material 
misstatement. 
 
C. Accounting for M&A: background & theory 
 One of the more technical and complex topics addressed in the SFAS 141 is the treatment of 
goodwill, which has long been a contentious component of accounting for business transactions. FASB 
                                                 
15 For the sake of brevity, I do not expand further on this point, but refer the interested reader to DeAngelo (1981), 
Palmrose (1988), and Francis et al. (1999). 
16 SFAS 141(R) was issued in 2007 with the intention of limiting the use of certain loopholes in the financial 
reporting of business combinations and clarifying the reporting of in-process research and development, transaction 
costs, and restructuring charges (Deng et al. 2008). The standard became effective for firms with fiscal year ends 
after December 15, 2008. Given the sample period under examination does not extend beyond December 31, 2007, 
the revised standard is not expected to significantly impact the results of the analyses. 
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defines goodwill as “[a]n asset representing the future economic benefits arising from other assets 
acquired in a business combination that are not individually identified and separately recognized” (FASB 
2001). Under SFAS 141, goodwill is calculated as the aggregate purchase price less the net of all other 
separately identifiable assets acquired. Another critical element of the standard was the elimination of 
goodwill amortization, which was allowed under APB Opinion No. 16.17 As such, this oft-significant 
element remains capitalized on the entity’s balance sheet, unless it is later found to have been impaired. 
 Given the nature of goodwill, its initial allocation is subject to the various M&A motivations, 
environmental factors and ultimately the outcomes of business combination transactions, which I describe 
in the preceding sections. Thus, goodwill balances may include important information about the quality of 
a firm’s M&A. In the mid-nineties, there were a handful of studies which examined the components of 
goodwill under APB Opinion No. 16. Collectively, these studies provide evidence that goodwill balances 
fairly represent a firm’s ongoing reputational value (Chauvin and Hirschey 1994), and that these balances 
do serve as useful predictors of future earnings and are thus incorporated by investors in their valuation of 
the firms (McCarthy and Schneider 1995). A subsequent study by Jennings et al. (1996) confirms a 
positive association between goodwill balances and equity valuations for a sample of 259 firms for fiscal 
years between 1982 and 1988.18 Furthermore, the authors find a weak negative association between equity 
valuation and goodwill amortization and conclude that investors perceive declines in the value of 
goodwill differently across the cross-section of firms. In this study, I build upon this previous research to 
analyze how indicators of potential agency conflicts and governance mechanisms may be associated with 
both aggregate and residual goodwill measures.  
                                                 
17 Under APB Opinion No. 16, firms were required to amortize goodwill over a period not to exceed forty years. 
Under SFAS142, which was issued concurrently with SFAS 141, firms are required to perform annual goodwill 
impairment assessments. 
18 Full data for their study (n=253 firms) were collected from published financial statements and from a mail survey 
sent out to firms reporting goodwill balances during the sample period. 
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3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
A. Hypotheses 1 & 2: M&A, governance and aggregate goodwill 
 As is described in the preceding sections, M&A are impacted by numerous governance 
mechanisms which are put in place to monitor management, such as the board of directors, managerial 
compensation contracts, significant independent blockholder/activist shareholdings, and bylaw and 
charter provisions (namely anti-takeover measures). Collectively, effective operation of these important 
monitoring mechanisms should mitigate the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980), 
resulting in the alignment of managerial and shareholder interests. However, if these mechanisms are 
ineffective in their design or operation then managers wield significant power and may become 
entrenched, increasing the likelihood that they pursue value-decreasing M&A (Roll 1986; Morck et al. 
1990; Harford 1999; Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Masulis et al. 2007; Hope and Thomas 2008).  
 Value-decreasing M&A imply overpayment at the time the transaction is completed. If true, then 
goodwill balances allocated through the transaction will be larger than they would have been had the firm 
not overpaid in the M&A transaction. If firms are more likely to complete value-decreasing M&A when 
agency conflicts are high and monitoring mechanisms are weak, then I would expect to find a positive 
(negative) association between potential agency conflicts (the strength of monitoring mechanisms) and 
aggregate goodwill. Further, M&A may provide an opportunity for managers to entrench themselves, 
thereby increasing potential agency conflicts (Shleifer and Vishny 1989), which would lead to similar 
expectations regarding the association between aggregate goodwill and both potential agency conflicts 
(positive) and the strength of monitoring mechanisms (negative).  
 On the other hand, stronger monitoring mechanisms may also lead to stronger firm performance, 
creating a larger pool of resources with which to pursue M&A (Jensen 1993). Thus, aggregate goodwill 
balances could actually be higher for firms with strong monitoring mechanisms. In this case, I would 
expect to find a negative (positive) association between potential agency conflicts (the strength of 
monitoring mechanisms) and aggregate goodwill. Given these conflicting rationales, I do not make a 
directional prediction regarding the association between goodwill balances and the monitoring 
mechanisms operating within a firm nor between goodwill balances and variables that proxy for agency 
conflicts. Thus, I propose the following two non-directional hypotheses: 
 
H1a:  There is an association between the strength of monitoring mechanisms and aggregate 
goodwill balances. 
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H1b:  There is an association between the level of potential agency conflicts and aggregate goodwill 
balances. 
 
 Previous studies have shown aggregate goodwill to be significantly and positively associated with 
market value of equity (Chauvin and Hirschey 1994; McCarthy and Schneider 1995; Jennings et al. 
1996), suggesting that goodwill implies future economic returns to the firm. However, some studies in 
finance provide compelling evidence that ill-advised M&A erode firm value, especially in cases where 
potential agency conflicts are high (Morck et al. 1990; Harford 1999; Grinstein and Hribar 2004). 
Investors may have differing perceptions of a firm’s aggregate goodwill balance dependent on the varying 
governance environments in which the firm operates.   
 Firms with high potential agency conflicts (strong monitoring mechanisms) are more (less) likely 
to have completed ill-advised M&A in the past implying lower (greater) economic returns associated with 
the aggregate goodwill balances that are a byproduct of these transactions. In addition, firms with high 
potential agency conflicts (strong monitoring mechanisms) are less (more) likely to be successful in 
creating value from its previous M&A activities as a result of possible managerial entrenchment. These 
observations imply a weaker (stronger) positive association between goodwill and market value of equity 
for firms with high potential agency conflicts (strong monitoring mechanisms). I propose the following 
two hypotheses:  
 
H2a:  Investors’ perceptions of the value of aggregate goodwill (the association between aggregate 
goodwill and market valuation) are more positive for firms with strong monitoring 
mechanisms. 
H2b:  Investors’ perceptions of the value of aggregate goodwill (the association between aggregate 
goodwill and market valuation) are less positive for firms with high potential agency 
conflicts. 
 
B. Hypotheses 3 & 4: M&A, governance and residual goodwill 
 Since aggregate goodwill balances may not provide a sufficiently refined measure for assessing 
the quality of M&A activity nor for assessing the impact that potential agency conflicts and monitoring 
mechanisms may have on M&A, I define a more precise residual goodwill measure for the next set of 
hypotheses. To define this measure, I follow prior research, which decomposes goodwill into distinct 
components to perform more refined tests of goodwill (Johnson and Petrone 1998; Henning et al. 2000; 
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Bugeja and Gallery 2006; Shalev 2009) and use these more refined goodwill measures to analyze the 
association between M&A, governance structures and residual goodwill balances.  
 Prior research identifies four components which together constitute aggregate goodwill (Johnson 
and Petrone 1998; Henning et al. 2000). Two of these components – the synergy and going concern 
elements – imply future economic returns to the firm and should be deemed valuable by the firms’ 
investors. The other two components – the purchase price and consideration elements – capture factors 
associated with the final negotiated purchase price that do not clearly imply future economic benefits. 
Henning et al. (2000) combine these last two components to form their residual goodwill measure, which 
they show to be negatively associated with market value. 
 Adopting this conceptualization, I focus on residual goodwill in developing hypotheses three and 
four (H3 and H4), in an effort to more thoroughly examine the associations between M&A, governance 
structures and goodwill balances. I measure residual goodwill using both the Henning et al. (2000) 
method and an alternative approach adopted by Shalev (2009). Conceptually, residual goodwill is 
comprised of two elements: a purchase price element and a consideration element. To the extent residual 
goodwill is dominated by the purchase price element, higher residual balances imply a growing gap 
between the consideration offered in a M&A transaction and the fair values of identifiable assets 
acquired, suggesting possible overpayment. Overpayment in M&A is more likely to occur as potential 
agency conflicts increase and/or in the presence of weaker monitoring mechanisms. Thus, a positive 
(negative) association between potential agency conflicts (the strength of monitoring mechanisms) and 
residual goodwill suggests that a larger residual goodwill balance is indicative of overpayment in the 
M&A transaction (e.g. a “low quality” transaction).  
 Residual goodwill may also represent the value of consideration offered in payment in the M&A 
transaction (i.e., the consideration element). The consideration element of residual goodwill stems from 
the valuation of the underlying assets exchanged by the acquiring firm in the transaction. Two examples 
of this are: (1) foreign exchange rate fluctuations corresponding with M&A involving foreign firms; and 
(2) over/under-valuation of acquiring firms’ shares exchanged in stock transactions. Given that foreign 
firms and M&A are excluded from the residual goodwill analyses performed in this study, the 
consideration component should only be capturing the effects of any equity purchase price components 
for these tests. Unfortunately, the direction of the association between governance structures and the 
(equity-based) consideration element of residual goodwill is not clear-cut. On the one hand, managers 
may use over priced shares to pursue ill-advised M&A (Gu and Lev 2008). In fact, some managers appear 
to manage earnings in advance of an equity-based acquisition in order to boost the value of the acquiring 
firm’s shares, effectively reducing the cost to the acquiring firm (Louis 2004). These observations imply a 
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positive (negative) association between potential agency conflicts (the strength of monitoring 
mechanisms) and residual goodwill balances related to the consideration element. 
 However, the agency theory of the firm predicts an inverse relation between firm value and 
potential agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Several studies in finance build upon this 
expected relation as a foundation for empirical analysis. For example, Morck et al. (1988) present 
evidence that firm value is inversely associated with agency conflicts arising from managerial 
shareholdings, and Coles et al. (2008) use a measure of firm value in tests to determine whether there 
exists an optimum board size. To the extent that share values imply lower potential agency conflicts 
(stronger monitoring mechanisms), a negative (positive) association is expected between these 
corresponding measures and the consideration element of residual goodwill. I propose the following two 
non-directional hypotheses: 
 
H3a:  There is an association between the strength of monitoring mechanisms and residual goodwill 
balances. 
H3b:  There is an association between the level of potential agency conflicts and residual goodwill 
balances. 
 
 Henning et al. (2000) find that investors value the synergy and going concern components of 
goodwill, but discount the residual component. However, the authors do not consider governance 
structures in their analysis. It is plausible that investors will place differing values on the residual 
component of goodwill depending on the level of potential agency conflicts and the strength of a firm’s 
monitoring mechanisms. As is the case with H3, the expected associations between market value, residual 
goodwill and governance structures are likely to depend on which element of residual goodwill is 
predominantly captured by the measure. The purchase price element of residual goodwill suggests 
overpayment in a M&A transaction, which should be discounted by investors as it implies little, if any, 
future economic benefits to the acquiring firm’s shareholders. However, the consideration element of 
residual goodwill effectively captures a purchase price discount to the extent the consideration offered by 
the acquiring firm is over-valued at the time of the transaction, leading investors to be more optimistic in 
valuing this element of residual goodwill. Ultimately, these two residual goodwill elements may be 
difficult to disentangle, so investors may look to a firm’s governance environment in making their 
assessments of residual goodwill. 
 I test whether investors’ perceptions of residual goodwill differ based on a firm’s governance 
environment. Henning et al. (2000) provide evidence that investors discount residual goodwill, however, I 
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expect that this association may be moderated by governance structures. When potential agency conflicts 
are high, managers are more likely to have engaged in lower-quality M&A, resulting in high residual 
goodwill balances that investors would be expected to discount in valuing the firm. Alternatively, when 
monitoring mechanisms are strong, managers are more likely to have opportunistically used over-priced 
shares to pursue higher-quality M&A at an effective discount. If true, this would also result in higher 
residual goodwill balances, however investors should be more optimistic about these residual goodwill 
allocations related to the consideration element in this scenario. I propose the following two hypotheses: 
 
H4a:  Investors’ perceptions of the value of residual goodwill (the association between residual 
goodwill and market valuation) are more positive for firms with strong monitoring 
mechanisms. 
H4b:  Investors’ perceptions of the value of residual goodwill (the association between residual 
goodwill and market valuation) are less positive for firms with high potential agency 
conflicts. 
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
A. Model specification 
 Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) identify five firm-specific exogenous variables, which they expect 
to be prime determinants of goodwill. Fully specified, they employ the following model to test whether 
each of these determinants is associated with aggregate goodwill balances: 19 
 
 GDWL = ß0 + ß1 XAD + ß2 XRD + ß3 MKTSHR + ß4 INTANLG (1) 
 + ß5 TANA + e1 
 
 Their findings suggest a reliably positive association between goodwill and both advertising 
expenditures and tangible assets. Although the association between R&D expenditures and goodwill is 
positive in the full sample, the association does not persist in sub-samples broken out between firms in 
manufacturing versus nonmanufacturing sectors. In fact, the association is significantly negative for the 
R&D intensive manufacturing sector. No reliable association is shown between goodwill and the 
remaining variables, market share and intangible assets. Overall, the R-squared value for the full sample 
is 31.2 percent (Chauvin and Hirschey 1994).  
 Thus, the Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) model explains less than one-third of the variation in 
goodwill throughout the sample time period meaning that crucial determinants of goodwill are likely 
excluded from this model and captured in the error term. This is not surprising as governance structures 
are not considered in the model. Given that goodwill can only be allocated in a business combination and 
given the significant impact of governance mechanisms and agency conflicts on M&A activity described 
in the preceding pages, I expect that governance structures will be significantly associated with goodwill 
balances. 
 In Section 2.B above, I describe several governance mechanisms that may impact a firm’s M&A 
decisions which could potentially affect the allocation of goodwill. However, operationalizing these 
measures into a tractable model presents several unique challenges (Larcker et al. 2007; Dey 2008). First 
among these challenges is incorporating the sheer number of governance structures and mechanisms that 
have been identified to date. For instance, Larcker et al. (2007) identify 39 different structural measures 
of governance that have yielded mixed results in prior research. Focusing on the agency problem, Dey 
(2008) identifies 22 individual governance variables. To suitably incorporate all of the important 
governance measures, both sets of authors use principal component analysis (PCA) to identify the 
                                                 
19 Variable descriptions are provided in Appendices B and C. 
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primary dimensions of corporate governance. In so doing, the authors capture the strongest combinations 
of variables which are believed to represent the important dimensions of corporate governance. Following 
a similar approach, I calculate three distinct governance structure variables: two monitoring measures 
(INSIDEMON and OUTSIDEMON) and a separate measure that proxies for the level of agency conflicts 
present (AGENCY). 
 A second issue that must be considered when performing a study involving corporate governance 
is the availability of data. Given the wide range of governance variables to consider, a researcher often 
must make use of several different databases which inevitably leads to loss of observations due to missing 
data. Further, the inclusion of governance variables from several different databases is likely to restrict 
the resulting sample to larger firms as these firms are more likely to be included in the available 
governance datasets. These are certainly challenges that I face in this study and I discuss the implications 
on my sample construction in Section 4.B below. 
 The third – and potentially most daunting – challenge present in most governance studies is the 
problem of endogenously determined governance structures (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Bushman and 
et al. 2004; Dey 2008). An example of how this joint hypothesis would be manifested in the proposed 
hypotheses is described in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Bushman et al. (2004). Hermalin and 
Weisbach suggest that director selection and board effectiveness are likely to be endogenously dependent 
on environmental characteristics such as the CEO’s involvement in the director selection process. 
Bushman et al. suggest that board structures and effectiveness are associated with firm operating 
environment (factors such as operational complexity and earnings timeliness).  
 Larcker et al. (2007) address the endogeneity problem in a related study, acknowledging that the 
endogenous nature of a firm’s governance choices may lead to inconsistent estimates of the true 
association between the governance variables (regressors) and the accounting outcome variable 
(dependent variable). Similarly, the theoretical linkages I draw between goodwill (the accounting 
outcome/dependent variable) and internal monitoring mechanisms are likely to be overly simplified (i.e. 
H1 and H3 only).20 I attempt to address the potential endogeneity problem in two ways. First, I perform 
the H1 hypotheses tests using a fixed-effects OLS regression, controlled at the firm level. This approach 
should control for any of the firm-specific endogenous factors that do not change over time. However, I 
note that this approach is not feasible for the H3 determinants tests given the reduced sample size. 
Further, the fixed-effects regression approach would not be expected to capture the impact of endogenous 
                                                 
20 Given that the H2 and H4 analyses focus on investors’ perceptions of goodwill, the endogeneity concerns are 
eliminated as the governance structure variables (regressors) are no longer endogenous choice variables in the 
shareholder perceptions models. Instead, these variables are considered to be environmental moderators of 
shareholder perceptions of goodwill. 
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firm-level factors that change from year-to-year. Therefore as a second approach, I perform the Hausman 
(1978) procedure and two-stage least squares (2SLS) analyses to ensure the findings are not induced 
through the presence of endogeneity. I expand upon this second approach and related findings in Section 
5.C below. 
 To test H1a and H1b, I extend model (1) by including three separate governance structure 
variables that capture the effects of potential agency conflicts and internal/external monitoring activities. 
The full model is specified as follows (with firm-year fixed effects and industry/ year dummies): 
  
 GDWL = ß0 + ß1 XAD + ß2 R&D + ß3 MKTSHR + ß4 INTANLG  (2) 
 + ß5 TANA + ß6 AGENCY + ß7 INSIDEMON + ß8 OUTSIDEMON + e1 
 
 In the next set of tests, I examine whether governance structures and potential agency conflicts 
impact investors’ perceptions of goodwill. A prior study by McCarthy and Schneider (1995) employs a 
modified version of the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) simple clean surplus valuation model to test the 
association between goodwill and market valuation.21 According to Feltham and Ohlson, the market value 
of the firm can be better measured using a model that includes both a stock concept (book value of the 
firm) and a flow concept (income variables) of the firm. McCarthy and Schneider (1995) split book value 
into three components: assets less goodwill (ALGW), goodwill (GW), and liabilities (LIAB). 
Additionally, the authors include a measure of income (INC). The fully specified model is: 
 
 MVE = ß0 + ß1 ALGW + ß2 GW + ß3 LIAB + ß4 INC + e1   (3) 
 
 To test hypotheses 2a-2b, I include in model (3) each of the three governance measures described 
above and interactions between each of these measures and goodwill. Thus, the fully specified model is as 
follows (controls for firm-year fixed effects and also includes industry and year dummies): 
 
 MVE = ß0 + ß1 GW + ß2 ALGW + ß3 LIAB + ß4 INC + ß5 HIGHAGENCY + (4) 
 ß6 STRINSMON + ß7 STROUTMON +  ß8 HIGHAGE x GW +  
 ß9 STRIMON x GW + ß10 STROMON x GW + e1 
 
                                                 
21 Bugeja and Gallery (2006) adopt a similar approach in their investigation of aged goodwill balances in a sample 
of Australian listed firms. 
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 There are a number of published studies that examine investors’ perceptions of goodwill in 
different contexts and settings. For instance, Bugeja and Gallery (2006) find that investors value recently 
acquired goodwill, but place little value on goodwill balances acquired more than two years prior. 
Henning et al. (2000) decompose goodwill into four goodwill elements: (1) going-concern goodwill 
(GC_GDWL), (2) synergistic goodwill (SYN_GDWL), (3) purchase price goodwill and (4) consideration 
goodwill.22 Together the authors refer to these final two elements as residual goodwill (RESID_GDWL). 
The authors find that investors’ perceptions vary predictably between these elements. Henning et al. 
document a consistent positive association between both the synergy and going concern elements of 
acquired goodwill and firm market value of equity. The authors also provide evidence in support of a 
significant negative association between residual goodwill and market value of equity. This second 
finding suggests that higher residual goodwill balances imply lower quality M&A leading to a lower 
market valuations. Since residual goodwill is likely to be a better proxy for M&A quality than would the 
synergy and going concern elements of goodwill, I focus the next set of hypotheses tests on residual 
goodwill. I first examine the associations between residual goodwill balances, levels of potential agency 
conflicts and governance mechanisms. I then test whether investors’ perceptions of the residual goodwill 
component vary according to the agency conflicts and governance mechanisms for a particular firm. To 
perform these analyses, I calculate residual goodwill using two distinct methods. 
 The primary method I adopt is consistent with Henning et al. (2000). The authors calculate 
residual goodwill as the excess of purchased goodwill less the going concern and synergistic goodwill 
components. Going concern goodwill is measured as the pre-offer market value of the acquired (target) 
firm less the fair value of the assets acquired (Henning et al. 2000). The authors calculate synergistic 
goodwill using a model first proposed by Bradley et al. (1988) and I adopt the same approach. To proxy 
for the expected synergistic gains from the transaction, Henning et al. (2000) calculate the 11-day 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for both the target and acquiring firm, centered on the M&A 
transaction announcement date.23,24 I follow this approach to identify residual (RESID_GDWL), going 
concern (GC_GDWL) and synergy (SYN_GDWL) components of goodwill. 
                                                 
22 These classifications follow distinctions first identified by Johnson and Petrone (1998). 
23 Consistent with Henning et al. (2000), I aggregate abnormal returns over the initial announcement and subsequent 
bids when the initial bid is rejected. I calculate abnormal returns using market model prediction errors and 
parameters are estimated for the target and acquiring firms separately using a (-300, -61) day window relative to day 
0 when the first bid is made public. 
24 I calculate synergy goodwill consistent with Henning et al. (2000). This measure is based on a paper by Bradley et 
al. (1988), who examine synergistic returns in M&A and the allocation of these returns between the acquirers and 
target shareholders. Including the target firm returns may over-represent the true synergy element of goodwill that is 
allocated in the M&A transactions, however the impact is expected to be slight given that synergy goodwill is the 
smallest of the three components in this study as I find that the acquiring firms tend to be significantly larger than 
the targets in this sample. 
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 A second method for estimating residual goodwill is employed by Shalev (2009) in his analysis 
of M&A disclosure quality. Shalev calculates his residual goodwill measure by taking the residuals of the 
following equation: 
 
 GDWLCONS = ß1 + ß2INDACQ + ß3INDTRG + ß4GROWTH + ei  (5) 
 
 GDWLCONS is the ratio of goodwill acquired to the total purchase price. INDACQ and 
INDTRG are the two-digit SIC codes of the acquiring and target firms respectively. Finally, growth is the 
median analyst long-term growth forecast for the acquiring firm. I include this separate measure to ensure 
the results are robust to different methods of calculating residual goodwill.  
 To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, I regress model (2) above replacing the dependent variable, 
goodwill (GDWL), with either of the residual goodwill measures I describe above. Given the hand 
collected nature of the data necessary to calculate these residual goodwill measures, I perform these 
analyses over a much more limited sample. Also, observations no longer represent firm-years, rather I 
will be using transaction-level data (where ni represents a specific M&A transaction during the sample 
time period for firm i). Thus, the aggregate financial statement variables from model (2) are replaced with 
equivalent amounts allocated in the total purchase price for the corresponding M&A transaction. I 
describe the sampling procedure I use to form the residual goodwill analyses sub-sample in the following 
section. Given the importance of target firm characteristics, which I describe above in the background and 
theory development sections, I also control for transaction-level and target firm (TLTF) control variables, 
which I define in Table 8, Panel B.25 Fully specified, the model I use to test hypotheses 3a and 3b is as 
follows (also includes industry and year dummies): 
 
 RESID_GDWL = ß0 + ß1 PURCH_IPRD + ß2 MKTSHR +    (6) 
 ß3 PURCH_INTAN + ß4 PURCH_TAN + ß5  AGENCY + 
 ß6 INSIDEMON + ß7 OUTSIDEMON + ßk TLTF control variables + e1 
 
 To test hypotheses 4a and 4b, I follow a similar modeling approach as I describe above for model 
(4), with three important changes. First, I select a new market value measure that ensures investors have 
time to obtain and review the purchase price allocation for each specific transaction in the sample. I note 
that purchase price disclosures tend to be inconsistent in quarterly filings and so I elect to use the market 
                                                 
25 All tables are located in Appendix A. 
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value of the firm based on the closing share price of the firm’s common stock 90-days (one-quarter) after 
the first purchase price allocation provided in the acquiring firm’s annual 10-K filing.26 
 Second, I include in the model TLTF control variables similar to those included in model (6) 
above. Third, I replace total goodwill with the residual goodwill measures described above and control for 
acquired synergy and going concern goodwill as well as goodwill acquired in other (prior) transactions. 
Fully specified, I define the following model to test H4a and H4b (also includes industry and year 
dummies): 
 
 MVE2 = ß0 + ß1 RESID_GDWL + ß2 SYN_GDWL + ß3 GC_GDWL  (7) 
 + ß4 OTH_GDWL + ß5 ALGW + ß6 LIAB + ß7 INC 
 + ß8 HIGHAGENCY + ß9 STRINSMON + ß10 STROUTMON  
 + ß11 HIGHAGE x GW + ß12 STRIMON x GW + ß13 STROMON x GW  
 + ßk TLTF control variables + e1 
 
I define the main test and control variables in Appendix B. Underlying governance variables are described 
at length in Appendix C and TLTF control variables are defined in Table 8, Panel B. 
 
B. Sample selection and databases 
 I start by obtaining firm-level financial data from the full population of Compustat firms for the 
sample period 2004 through 2007 (n=23,073). Given that the focus of this study is on U.S. firms, I drop 
all foreign domiciled firms (n=3,253). In addition, this study only focuses on those firms listed on one of 
the three major U.S. exchanges (NASDAQ, AMEX, or NYSE). As such, I drop all firms not listed on one 
of these three exchanges from the study (n=1,901).  
 Like Chauvin and Hirschey (1994), I apply a market capitalization screen to avoid valuation 
errors associated with thinly traded securities. I choose a cut-off market capitalization of $75M (n=2,997), 
which is the market capitalization cut-off for firms to comply with SOX (PCAOB 2004).27 Due to the 
inherent complexity of regulations governing the financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999), I withhold 
                                                 
26 Typically the initial allocation is disclosed in the first quarterly (10-Q) filing following the completion of the 
merger (or the 10-K for M&A transactions made during the last quarter of the fiscal year). However, using the 10-K 
date ensures that the purchase price allocation disclosures are more consistent amongst the sample firms and further 
ensures that these allocations have been subjected to year-end audit procedures. As a sensitivity test, I also perform 
the H4 analysis using the market value six days after initial disclosure of the purchase price as the dependent 
variable as described in Section 5.C. 
27 Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) apply a $100M screen in their analysis. I would not expect the findings to be 
influenced unreasonably by applying a more relaxed screen in this study. 
 27
these firms from analyses (n=3,547). Finally, I require all sample firms to have positive goodwill 
balances. Thus, I drop those firms with goodwill balances that are either zero or missing (n=3,463).  
 The above screens leave a total of 7,912 observations, representing (2,534) unique firms with 
positive goodwill values. I next merge this dataset with a dataset of governance variables compiled from 
five additional databases: (1) broad governance data provided by The Corporate Library (TCL); (2) 
executive compensation data provided by Compustat’s Execucomp; (3) certain agency conflict variables 
use data compiled in the quarterly Compustat database; (4) external monitoring / shareholder data 
provided by Thomson’s Spectrum database; and (5) data on anti-takeover mechanisms provided by 
Riskmetrics/IRRC. As a result of these merges, the sample is further reduced by more than half (n=4,169) 
due to the exclusion of certain firms in one or more of these five databases.28  After completing the 
governance merge, I drop observations where one or more of the required governance variables are 
missing (n=486). Finally given discrepancies between Big N and non-Big N auditors in an M&A context 
identified by Louis (2005), I drop those observations where a non-Big N firm is the auditor (n=108). 
 The resulting aggregate goodwill dataset includes 3,149 firm-year observations representing 904 
unique firms, which will be used in the tests of H1 and H2. Requiring data from several datasets 
invariably leads to significant loss of data, which may limit my ability to generalize results to the broad 
spectrum of firms. However, I note that my sample compares favorably with Dey (2008), whose sample 
consists of 371 firms from 2000 and 2001 using data obtained from Spectrum and ExecuComp. Table 1, 
Panel A presents the above sample construction process in tabular form. Of the 904 unique firms, 642 
firms are included in each of the four years represented in the sample (e.g., the constant sample).  
 In the tests of H3 and H4, the focus shifts to residual goodwill requiring hand collected 
information from a variety of sources. Given the intensity of this task, I limit the analyses to a subsample 
of firms that engage in M&A during 2004-2007. To identify the M&A transactions, I first obtain from 
CRSP a listing of all merger related delistings for 2003 through 2007 in which the listed acquiring firm is 
included in the aggregate goodwill sample used to test H1 and H2. I initiate this search in CRSP because 
the residual goodwill calculations require that both the target and acquiring firms have returns and market 
value data available for certain key dates surrounding each transaction. Based on this search, I identify  
                                                 
28 For example, The Corporate Library contains information on more than 4,000 firms, but this number represents 
the available information for the entire 2001-2007 period and not consistent firm reporting across all years. The 
database includes data on approximately 2,000 unique firms in 2004 and 2005 and more than 3,000 unique firms in 
2006 and 2007. However, these subtotals include financial firms, firms not reporting positive goodwill, non-U.S. 
firms and a small number of OTC firms which are all excluded from my sample through one of the screens I 
describe above. Thus, it is not unreasonable to observe substantial attrition in the sample size when including these 
governance variables, especially considering that the governance data is compiled from five separate databases 
which are likely to track and report data for different sets of firms. 
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305 possible M&A transactions closing between 2003 and 2007. I next compare the merger close dates to 
each acquirer’s fiscal year-end dates and eliminate those transactions that did not close during the 2004-
2007 sample period (n=83). I further eliminate 22 transactions representing multiple M&A transactions 
by the acquiring firm in the same fiscal year. For the remaining 200 transactions, I obtain the initial 
purchase price allocations disclosed in the first 10-K filed subsequent to the close of the transaction and I 
eliminate an additional eight M&A transactions where no purchase price allocation is provided.  
 I search press releases and target and acquiring firm proxy statements to obtain other transaction-
level information to include as control variables and I use EVENTUS to calculate synergistic returns 
surrounding the announcement date(s).29 I obtain target firm financial information prior to the M&A 
transaction from Compustat and target and acquiring firm’s stock returns data and market value data from 
CRSP. Required returns data is missing for an additional two transactions, resulting in a final residual 
sample comprised of 190 M&A transactions with complete data. I provide a tabular breakdown of the 
residual goodwill sample in Table 1, Panel B.  
 The final residual goodwill sample includes 160 unique firms. Two of these firms have M&A 
transactions included in each of the four residual goodwill sample years (8 total transactions) and another 
two firms have transactions in three of the four residual goodwill sample years (6 total transactions). 20 
firms have M&A transactions in two of the four sample years (40 total transactions) and 136 firms have a 
single M&A transaction included in the residual goodwill sample. Of the 160 unique residual goodwill 
sample firms, 126 are included amongst the 642 constant sample firms I refer to above. See Table 1, 
Panel C for a representative breakdown of the unique residual goodwill sample firms across the four-year 
sample period. 
 In tests of H2 and H4, I classify the observations into one of two potential agency conflict 
(high/low) and internal and external monitoring (strong/weak) groupings. For each of the three 
governance structure variables, I create a dummy variable taking the value of “1” for those observations 
whose corresponding governance structure scores fall above the 66th percentile.30 Table 1, Panel D 
provides a breakdown of the full and residual goodwill samples into each of the governance structure 
buckets (8 in total). By construction, approximately one-third of the aggregate goodwill sample 
(n=1,071) is classified into any of the four “high agency” buckets, however this percentage increases to 
nearly one-half (n=92) of the 190 residual goodwill sample observations. This provides some evidence 
                                                 
29 See footnotes 20 and 21 for additional details regarding the measurement of synergistic returns. 
30 Admittedly, using a cut-off at the 66th percentile is arbitrary so I perform sensitivity analyses with cut-offs at the 
both the 75th percentile and the median values, which are described in Section 5.C. 
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that firms operating in the presence of higher agency conflicts are more likely to pursue M&A of 
publicly-listed targets that comprise the residual goodwill sample.31 
 Table 2, Panel A presents the industry breakout based on the two-digit SIC codes for the full 
sample firms (n=904) in comparison to all non-financial, U.S.-based firms included in the Compustat 
database. 32 Business services (SIC 73) firms are the most heavily represented in the full sample (13.2%), 
which is similar to the representation amongst the Compustat population of firms (14.1%). Other 
industries heavily represented in the sample are Electrical (SIC 36 – 9.7%), Chemicals (SIC 28 – 8.7%), 
Instruments (SIC 38 – 8.0%), and Industrial (SIC 35 – 7.5%). Together, firms in these top five industries 
comprise nearly half of the sample (47.1%).  
 The table presents mean, minimum and maximum goodwill by industry. Communications (SIC 
48) has the highest mean goodwill amongst all industries and it is also the industry with the firm reporting 
the highest goodwill in the sample ($70,713 million). The industry breakout for the residual goodwill 
sample is presented in Table 2, Panel B. The top five industries for the full sample are also the top five 
industries in the residual goodwill sample, where they comprise over 60% of the represented industries. 
 Descriptive statistics for the 28 underlying governance variables are provided in Table 3, Panel A. 
For the six variables used to construct the agency conflict measure, I note that the sample firms are very 
similar in size and ownership structure to the firms analyzed by Dey (2008) in her study. However, the 
GROWTH and LEV variables are notably different reflecting distinct market conditions likely to be 
unique to each study (Dey’s study spans 2000-01 versus the 2004-07 time period for this study). The 
sample firms in this study have significantly higher GROWTH (book-to-market) and significantly lower 
LEV (leverage) statistics as compared to the 371 firms comprising Dey’s sample. The RISK and FCF 
scores appear to be slightly lower than those reported by Dey, however the scores are likely reasonable 
given that my sample covers a broader cross section of firms. I would expect the larger number of small 
firms in my sample to portray lower RISK and FCF scores overall, driving the mean scores down for 
these variables. 
 Blockholder and activist shareholder variables are relatively consistent with the statistics 
presented in Larcker et al. (2007), with a mean 2.6 blockholders holding an average of 20% percent of the 
company. The mean holdings for the largest shareholder are 11%. I report a higher presence of activist 
shareholders (average is 11 activists compared with seven reported in Larcker et al.’s study), but activist 
                                                 
31 Requiring market value and returns data for both the acquiring and the target firm implies that the target firms are 
publicly traded firms. Thus, they represent a certain set M&A which may not be representative of all M&A. This is 
a limitation of my study which I describe further in Section 7 below. 
32 In the main analyses, I use the Fama-French 11 industry specification to identify the industry dummy variables. 
However, I also re-run all of the tests using industry dummies based on all represented two-digit SIC codes and 
obtain similar results in each case. 
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shareholdings remain relatively small as a percentage of outstanding shares at 2.8%, consistent with the 
numbers reported in this study.  
 Companies have an average of nine board members, of which nearly 72% are unaffiliated with 
the company (i.e., independent). Further, I note that the average board holds approximately eight 
meetings per year. Approximately 89% of board directors sit on fewer than four outside boards whereas 
74% do not currently serve as an acting CEO in addition to their board responsibilities.  
 The chairman is also the CEO in 1,868 of the firm-year observations (61%), which is consistent 
with both the Larcker et al. (2007) and Dey (2008) studies.33 The CEO is also the founder in 
approximately 220 cases (7%) and the founder sits on the board in another approximately 564 cases 
(18%). Altogether, equity-based compensation comprises 63% of the total compensation package for 
CEOs in this sample, whereas bonuses constitute 13% of total pay. In five percent of the observations, 
managers hold shares totaling between 5% and 25% of the company, and the CEO_TURN variable 
indicates the CEO turnover occurred in 37.3% of the observations (or 317 unique firms, representing 35% 
of the 904 sample firms). Sample firms are more likely than not to have poison pill provisions (59%) and 
staggered boards (59%), but are unlikely to have unequal voting rights (1%) or supermajority voting 
provisions (17%). Only 10% of the observations represent firms based in states that offer greater 
protections to management. 
 Financial variable summary statistics are highlighted in Table 3, Panel B. The typical aggregate 
goodwill sample firm has more than $6.9 billion in average total assets and the median firm reports assets 
of nearly $1.9 billion. Average goodwill is approximately $1.2 billion, representing nearly 18% of total 
assets. The residual goodwill sample firms are significantly larger with mean (median) assets of $20.7 
($6.8) billion and mean (median) goodwill of $4.5 ($1.4) billion. Goodwill represents approximately 21% 
of the total assets for the residual goodwill sample firms.  
 
C. Agency and monitoring variables construction (principle components analysis) 
 Consistent with Larcker et al. (2007) and Dey (2008) I employ exploratory principle component 
analysis (PCA) in order to define three governance structure measures: (1) sources of potential agency 
conflicts; (2) outside (external) monitoring sources; and (3) inside (internal) monitoring sources. I choose  
                                                 
33 Note that percentage reported here (in addition to those provided throughout this paragraph) describe cases where 
the applicable criteria is met (e.g., CEO is also the chair in 61% of the firm-year observations). Alternatively, the 
statistics in Table 3, present the inverse of these percentages, representing cases where the criteria is not met. This 
note applies to each of the percentages that follow in this paragraph except for CEO_BONUS/CEO_EBC. 
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to model internal and external monitoring mechanisms separately given the unique roles distinguishing 
these two sets of mechanisms and due to possible substitute/complement relationships that arise between 
these distinct sets of monitoring mechanisms (Gillan 2006). I perform PCA separately for each of the 
three broad governance structure measures using a total of 28 underlying governance variables: (1) 
sources of potential agency conflicts – six underlying variables; (2) external monitoring sources – five 
underlying variables; and (3) internal monitoring sources – 17 underlying variables.34 
 Table 4, Panels A through C present the PCA correlation tables for each of the three sets of 
underlying governance variables. In PCA, higher correlations are desirable suggesting interrelationships 
in the underlying data that can be collapsed into broader factors. However, I note that none of the 
underlying agency variables have correlations exceeding 0.30, suggesting that these six variables likely 
measure unique elements of potential agency conflicts. The correlations suggest that larger firms tend to 
have more diffuse ownership, higher free cash flow and leverage, whereas high growth firms tend to have 
smaller free cash flow.  
 For the external monitoring variables, BLOCKPCT is found to be significantly correlated with 
both BLOCKHOLDER (0.910) and LRGSHRHLDR (0.711), suggesting a strong correlation between 
total blockholdings and the total number of blockholders and the holdings of the largest unaffiliated 
blockholder. Examining the internal monitoring variables posted in Panel C reveals two significant 
correlations above 0.50: (1) CEO_EBC and CEO_BONUS and (2) FOUND_CEO and FOUND_BD. 
 
(Insert Table 4 approximately here) 
 
 In performing the PCA analysis, I retain all factors with an eigenvalue exceeding 1.0 and group 
together the underlying governance variables loading significantly (i.e., exceeding 0.40) on a factor 
consistent with Larcker et al. (2007). Like Dey et al. (2008), I perform an orthogonal rotation when 
evaluating the factor loadings instead of an oblique rotation because the orthogonal rotation provides for a 
cleaner interpretation of the factor loadings. PCA is an iterative process and in some cases I note that 
certain underlying governance variables do not load consistently on any of the retained factors. In these 
cases, they are deemed to be measuring a unique dimension and are excluded from further PCA iterations. 
Instead I include these variables (GROWTH, LEV for AGENCY and BD_UNAFFOUTSIDE, 
                                                 
34 It is important to note that other potential external monitoring sources have been accounted for (either directly or 
indirectly) in the analyses. Product markets have been included directly through the inclusion of financial statement 
variables such as total assets and market share. Leverage (included as one of six underlying agency variables) may 
also provide some indication of external monitoring related to debt contracting. Alternatively, auditor quality has 
been addressed indirectly as only Big N auditors are included in the sample and all firms are potential takeover 
targets subject to the market for corporate control. 
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BD_MTGS, CEO_SHR and UNEQVOTE for INSIDEMON) individually in calculating the final 
governance structure measures. Considering only those underlying variables that are included in the final 
PCA analyses, the AGENCY, OUTSIDEMON and INSIDEMON factors capture 61.3%, 71.4% and 
64.3% of the total variance in the underlying data, respectively.  
 Table 5, Panel A presents a summary of the final PCA factors and loadings. I tabulate Cronbach’s 
alpha measures for each of the individual PCA components and as an average for each of the three 
measures [reported in brackets]. As is the case with both the Larcker et al. (2007) and Dey (2008) studies, 
the Cronbach’s alpha scores are lower than the suggested benchmark of 0.70. As is stated by Larcker et 
al. (2007), this is not uncommon in exploratory PCA and further, these combined measures of governance 
would be expected to provide greater reliability than would individual governance measures. 
 After identifying each of the distinct governance factors (or components) through PCA (ten in 
total; two each for AGENCY and OUTSIDEMON and six factors for INSIDEMON), I next construct the 
three governance structure measures in a manner consistent with Larcker et al. (2007). To do this, I 
standardize all of the underlying governance variables and calculate a score for each governance factor 
using the averages of the standardized variables loading on that factor. I note that only the CEOCOMP 
factor has variables loading in opposite directions. The calculation of each of the remaining nine 
governance components is relatively straightforward. I calculate each corresponding governance 
component by summing the underlying governance variables and then dividing by the number of 
variables included (for instance, the LARGE component of the AGENCY measure would be calculated 
by summing the standardized SIZE and OWN scores and dividing by two).  
 I follow the same process to calculate the remaining eight agency and monitoring components 
(CEOCOMP is an exception as it is a unique case).35 Once I have calculated the 10 underlying 
governance factors attributable to AGENCY, OUTSIDEMON and INSIDEMON, I construct the 
governance structure variables themselves, which will be used as test variables throughout the analyses. 
To form these measures I include the factors identified in PCA and also include any of the original 
underlying governance variables that did not load in PCA and were subsequently dropped from the 
analysis.36 Descriptive statistics for each of the governance measures are provided in Table 5, Panel B and 
median scores within each of the two groupings (high/low or strong/weak) are provided in Table 5, Panel 
C. 
                                                 
35 Since CEO_EBC and CEO_BONUS load in opposite directions for this particular component, CEOCOMP is 
calculated by subtracting the standardized CEO_BONUS scores from the CEO_EBC scores and dividing by two. 
36 For example, the final AGENCY structure score is calculated as the sum of its two PCA components LARGE and 
CASH, summed with the standardized scores for each of the two underlying governance variables that did not load 
significantly in PCA – GROWTH and LEV – all divided by four. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
A. Agency conflicts, monitoring mechanisms and aggregate goodwill 
 The first series of analyses test H1 and H2, which focus on the associations between agency 
conflicts, monitoring mechanisms and aggregate goodwill. Table 6, Panel A presents the correlation table 
for the H1 regression variables. The correlation scores suggest that larger firms tend to have larger 
advertising expenses. The table also highlights a significant correlation between GDWL and INTANLG 
as well as GDWL and the AGENCY measure. This is to be expected as goodwill itself is an intangible 
asset. I estimate VIF scores, which are below the threshold of 10 cited by McCarthy and Schneider 
(1995), suggesting the multicollinearity is not likely to be an issue.  
 Table 6, Panel B presents the correlation scores for the H2 regression variables. Consistent with 
McCarthy and Schneider (1995), I note a highly significant correlation between ALGDWL and LIAB 
(Spearman score is 0.905). As a consequence, multicollinearity could be present in the data. I calculate 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) and find them to be above the benchmark value of 10 when ALGDWL 
and LIAB are included in the regression specifications. Thus, to ensure inferences are not affected by 
possible multicollinearity issues, I sum ALGDWL and LIAB to form a combined NETALGDWL 
measure. I obtain results that are unchanged from the original specification(s) when I employ regressions 
using this combined NETALGDWL measure.. 
 Table 7, Panel A presents the H1 tests of the association between governance measures and 
aggregate goodwill. Specification (1) is a baseline model, which I run to ensure relative consistency with 
the Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) study and to identify potential differences given the large gap in the 
sample years between their study and this analysis.37 I note that advertising expense data (XAD) is not 
available for nearly 60% of the sample, reducing the sample size to 1,338 firm year observations. 
Consistent with this prior study, I document a significant positive association between both tangible assets 
(TANA) and research and development expenses (XRD) and aggregate goodwill (GDWL) balances. A 
notable difference in my study is that advertising expenses (XAD) do not appear to be significant 
determinants of goodwill, whereas they are shown to be significantly, positively associated with goodwill 
in the Chauvin and Hirschey study. Additionally, I identify a significant positive association between 
INTANLG and GDWL, which was not consistently supported in this previous study. In fact, my 
regressions indicate that intangible assets are among the most significant predictors of goodwill across all  
                                                 
37 The Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) study includes data from 1989-1991, whereas my sample period spans 2004-
2007. Thus, there is a 13-year lapse between the end of the Chauvin and Hirschey sample period and the time period 
from which my sample is drawn. 
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specifications, marking a dramatic shift from the Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) results. While only 
conjecture, the contrasting findings may highlight the shift in the nature of businesses away from the 
fixed asset intensive, manufacturing-based businesses to the technology-heavy firms that have permeated 
the business landscape over the past decade. 
 In specification (2) I add the three governance structure variables to the baseline model used in 
specification (1). The associations between goodwill and each control variable are consistent with those 
described for specification (1). Examining the results related to the governance structure variables suggest 
a significant positive association between the AGENCY variable and aggregate goodwill, however 
neither INSIDEMON nor OUTSIDEMON appear to be associated with aggregate goodwill balances.  
 Noting that XAD remains insignificant in specification (2), I drop XAD from the regression 
model and run the specification (2) regression without this variable allowing for analysis on the full 
aggregate goodwill sample (n=3,149). The findings are generally consistent with those reported in 
specification (2); AGENCY is positively associated with aggregate goodwill but neither of the monitoring 
structure measures appear to be significantly associated with aggregate goodwill balances. I also run the 
specification (2) and specification (3) regressions on a year-by-year basis (without year dummies and  
firm-year fixed effects) and find the results (untabulated) are similar to those reported above. 
 Finally, in specification (4) I regress specification (3) on the reduced residual goodwill sample to 
identify possible differences in the distribution of firms that comprise the H3 and H4 tests. As with the 
previous three specifications, I document a significant positive relationship between GDWL and both 
INTANLG and AGENCY. For the subset of firms comprising the residual goodwill sample, I observe a 
negative association between GDWL and XRD, which is opposite of what I observe in the previous three 
specifications. This observation supports the findings of Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), who show that 
M&A amongst pharmaceutical firms provides acquiring firms an opportunity to “outsource” research and 
development activities, especially as internal R&D productivity declines. 
 Overall the findings provide support for H1b, suggesting that higher agency conflicts are 
associated with larger aggregate goodwill balances. The strength of internal and external monitoring 
mechanisms do not appear to be associated with aggregate merger balances and thus, I fail to reject the 
null hypothesis (H1a) that monitoring strength is not associated with aggregate goodwill balances. I next 
turn to tests of investors’ perceptions of goodwill to perform the H2a and H2b tests. 
 Table 7, Panel B documents the results of the H2 tests of investors’ perceptions of aggregate 
goodwill balances. In specification (1), I run a baseline model similar to the model used in McCarthy and 
Schneider (1995) in order to evaluate how my sample data compares (or fails to compare) to the data 
presented in their study. The results are very similar between the two studies, suggesting that the model 
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appears to be applicable despite the significant time lag between the two studies. It is interesting to note 
that the R-squared values are significantly lower in my study as compared to both McCarthy and 
Schneider (1995) and a study published by Henning et al. (2000).38 This may be evidence of a growing 
gap between (fair) market value and the book value of firms in the recent high technology era, which 
would be expected to diminish the association between the market value (dependent variable) and the 
decomposed balance sheet variables (regressors). Further, I note that the industry composition of my 
sample firms is likely to vary substantially from these prior studies given the significant changes in 
business and technology in the years between their corresponding sample periods and mine. Finally, the 
relative strength of the stock market during the corresponding sample periods would be expected to have 
a significant bearing on the r-squared scores in this analysis. Overall stock market performance was 
strong during my 2004-2007 sample period, which could lead to lower r-squared scores due to reduced 
variance in the dependent measure. 
 In specification (2), I include interactions involving the three dichotomous governance grouping 
variables (HIGHAGENCY, STROUTMON and STRINSMON) with goodwill (GDWL) to test whether 
investors’ perceptions of goodwill vary predictably depending on the agency risks and/or strength of 
monitoring present within each firm. Similar to the baseline model of specification (1), I identify a 
significant, positive association between the dependent variable, MVE, and the control variables 
ALGDWL and INC. I also document a strong, negative association between LIAB and MVE. The results 
provide evidence that investors value goodwill, however the negative coefficient on β8 suggests that 
investors’ perceptions of goodwill are significantly weaker when agency costs are high.  
 In specification (3), I re-estimate the specification (2) regression on the residual goodwill sample 
(n=189). The associations between MVE and GDWL, ALGDWL, and LIAB remain unchanged from 
specification (2). However, I note that HIGHAGExGDWL is no longer significant (p=.107) and UI is 
only marginally significant (0.072) in the predicted direction in specification (3).39 Thus, the specification 
(3) findings further highlight important differences between the residual and aggregate goodwill samples 
that ultimately may limit my ability to generalize the findings of subsequent tests of H3 and H4 to a 
broader population of firms. I expand on this point further in Section 7. 
                                                 
38 In annual regressions (untabulated), I note R-squared statistics ranging between 0.38 and 0.42, which are 
significantly lower than those reported in these two earlier studies (which are in the 0.80 to 0.90 range). 
39 As I describe in the “Limitations” section (7.A), the mean ratio of acquirer-to-target MVE is 66 for the residual 
goodwill sample, suggesting that the acquiring firms are substantially larger than the target firms. Thus, it is possible 
that the investors’ perceptions tests are weakened simply because the corresponding M&A activities are not 
significant to the acquirers’ total operations and therefore, do not weigh heavily in valuing the acquiring firm. I find 
that the H4 results are stronger when I limit my analysis to those M&A transactions where the acquiring and target 
firms are closer in size (n=95) and when I re-perform the H2 tests on this subsample, I find that HIGHAGExGDWL 
is negative and significant once again, as expected (results untabulated). 
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 In Table 7, Panel C, I summarize the joint tests for specification (2), which document the 
association between goodwill and market value of equity within each of the eight (8) possible governance 
environment buckets. In each case, investors’ are shown to positively value goodwill in the market, but 
the negative, significant interaction term coefficient (β8) suggests that the strength of this association 
weakens when agency conflicts are high, providing support for H2b. Surprisingly, H2a is not supported in 
the data suggesting that investors’ perceptions of goodwill are not affected by the strength of a firms 
internal or external monitoring mechanisms. 
 
B. Agency conflicts, monitoring mechanisms and residual goodwill 
 Residual goodwill is the focal point for the next series of tests, which should allow for a more 
refined assessment of the associations between M&A, agency conflicts, monitoring mechanisms and 
goodwill. Table 8, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the set of 190 M&A transactions that 
comprise the residual goodwill sample. The average purchase price is approximately $2.68 billion, but 
this figure is skewed upwards by giant transactions such as AT&T’s merger with BellSouth 
(approximately $68 billion) and the Gillette transaction completed by Procter and Gamble (approximately 
$53 billion). The median purchase price is $1.075 billion dollars, represented by Georgia Gulf 
Corporation’s 2006 purchase of Royal Group Technologies, Ltd, and the median column of Table 8, 
Panel A presents the purchase price allocation and goodwill breakout for this transaction. The average 
write-up across all transactions is $369.4 million, or 13.8% of the total purchase price, and the mean 
allocated goodwill of nearly $1.5 billion represents 54.3% of the total purchase price. These percentages 
are very consistent with corresponding percentages of 16.1% and 56.8% reported of by Henning et al. 
(2000). Further, I note the average ratio of goodwill to total purchase price for the 190 transactions in this 
study is similar to the 55.4% reported by Shalev (2009) in a recently published study.  
 Further breaking down total allocated goodwill into its going concern (GC_GDWL), synergy 
(SYN_GDWL) and residual (RESID_GDWL) components highlights two notable deviations from the 
Henning et al. (2000) study. In this prior study, the authors report GC_GDWL, SYN_GDWL and 
RESID_GDWL that represent 21.0%, 48.5% and 30.5% of total allocated goodwill respectively. I report a 
corresponding breakout in which nearly 62% of allocated goodwill is GC_GDWL whereas SYN_GDWL 
only represents 16% of total allocated goodwill. The remaining 22% percent of allocated goodwill is 
classified as RESID_GDWL. Thus, GC_GDWL and SYN_GDWL appear to have switched in 
prominence. This is most likely due to a large size discrepancy between bidder and target. Acquirers are 
nearly 66 times larger than the target firms measured using the ratio of acquirer-to-target net assets 
(MVE) in the 190 transactions comprising the residual goodwill sample. These ratios are dramatically 
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larger than the corresponding ratios of 7 (3.5) reported in the Henning et al. (2000) study. The sizable 
differences are likely due to the governance variable requirements I impose, which cause the sample to 
predominantly include larger firms. Further, I note that the sample appears to be dominated by technology 
and pharmaceutical firms where a substantial portion of the purchase price is allocated to in-process 
research and development (IPR&D). To the extent that the target firm R&D activities are valued by the 
market prior to the M&A transaction, the going concern calculations will be higher as IPR&D activities 
are not included in the fair value of net assets acquired. Although Henning et al. do not provide an 
industry breakout for their sample, it does appear as though financial services firms are included in their 
sample highlighting at least one additional area where the samples may differ. Based on these 
observations, the goodwill component breakdowns appear to be reasonable based on the distribution of 
M&A transactions that comprise the residual goodwill sample. 
 Table 8, Panel B presents summary statistics for the TLTF control variables that are to be used as 
controls in the H3 and H4 regressions. Variable definitions are presented in the footnotes to the table. The 
average acquisition spans nearly four months (116 days) between the initial announcement and the close 
date. The median time between the initial offer announcement and the acquisition close is 91 days and the 
longest closing period runs 430 days. I note that 63% of acquisitions involve targets in the same two-digit 
SIC code as the acquiring firm and that equity consideration represents approximately 28% of the 
purchase price in the average acquisition. Competing bids are publicly disclosed in eight percent of the 
acquisitions. The target firm CEO is also the chair in 44% of the acquisitions and the target firm CEO 
joins the acquiring firm in an employee (director) capacity in 28% (13%) of the acquisitions. The target 
firm CEO retires upon the closing of the merger in five percent (5%) of the 190 acquisitions. 
 Table 9, Panel A presents the correlation table for the H3 regression variables. The H3 regression 
variables are slightly modified from those tested in H1 as the focus shifts to the individual transaction 
level. Thus, I replace financial statement control variables (XRD, INTANLG and TANA) with 
acquisition-level equivalents (PURCH_IPRD, PURCH_INTAN, and PURCH_NA). Although the tests 
focus on residual goodwill, I also control for synergy (SYN_GDWL) and going concern goodwill 
(GC_GDWL). I note the Spearman correlation scores are significant and at or above 0.50 for 
RESID_GDWL and GC_GDWL and PURCH_INTAN and GC_GDWL. Further I note the Pearson 
correlation is significant and greater than 0.50 for PURCH_INTAN and SYN_GDWL. These correlations 
indicate that the “high quality” synergy and going concern elements of goodwill tend to increase in the 
level of intangible assets acquired. To ensure multicollinearity is not present in the data, I estimate VIFs 
and find the scores are all well below the threshold of 10. 
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 The correlation table for the H4 regression variables is presented in Table 9, Panel B. Although 
the focal point remains centered on the 190 acquisitions comprising the residual goodwill sample in the 
H4 analysis, I do not include the purchase allocation amounts as I do in the H3 regression. Instead, I once 
again include aggregated firm level financial statement control variables (identical to the H2 tests) as the 
acquisition-level equivalents I include in the H3 regressions would not be expected to have a significant 
impact on overall firm market value of equity measure.40 Thus, the primary modification I make to the H2 
regression is to split the goodwill corresponding to each acquisition out into its separate components. I 
then include an aggregated “other goodwill” (OTH_GDWL) measure which separately captures all other  
goodwill reported at year-end (including goodwill allocated in other acquisitions during the year and 
goodwill allocated in previous years). As a second modification, the original year-end market value of 
equity measure from (H2) is replaced with a new market value of equity measure consistent with Henning 
et al. (2000). The modified MVE measure represents the market value (scaled by shares outstanding) 90 
days after the first 10-K disclosure of the acquisition. Using the MVE corresponding with this date 
ensures that the purchase price allocation has been subjected to a year-end audit and further allows 
sufficient time for investors to make an assessment on the qualities of the acquisition. 
 As is the case with the H2 regression variables, I find LIAB and ALGDWL to be highly 
correlated (Spearman score is 0.93) introducing potential multicollinearity issues. As such, I re-run the H4 
analyses using NETALGDWL in place of ALGDWL and LIAB and find the results unchanged. I also 
note the Pearson correlation score between RESID_GDWL and HIGHAGExR_GDWL is extremely high 
(0.95), which is not unusual to find between an interaction variable and one of its component variables. 
However, the VIFs for RESID_GDWL and HIGHAGExR_GDWL are also above the benchmark of 10 
due to the high correlation between these two variables. Unfortunately, as these are both test variables I 
cannot drop or combine these variables to reduce or circumvent the effects of multicollinearity as I do 
with ALGDWL and LIAB. As a result, the variances and standard errors are inflated for the affected 
variables leading to wider confidence intervals and making it more difficult to reject the null hypotheses. 
 When interpreting these results, it is important to consider the breakout illustrated in Table 1, 
Panel D, which classifies each of the 190 acquisitions into the eight possible agency conflict/monitoring 
strength groupings. Some of the groupings have only a small number of observations, which would likely 
result in higher standard errors and wider confidence intervals. This, when coupled with the 
multicollinearity issues described above, suggests the results of the H4 tests of investors’ perceptions of 
                                                 
40 However, I note that these other purchase price allocation elements are included in the aggregated year-end 
financial statement numbers that I use (PURCH_TAN and PURCH_INTAN in the appropriate tangible/intangible 
assets accounts and PURCH_IPRD included in the annual research and development expenses). 
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residual goodwill must be interpreted with caution. I further elaborate on this important limitation and 
possible future research opportunities that may be used to strengthen the findings in Section 7 below. 
 I present the results of the H3 (H4) regressions in Table 10, Panel A (Panels B & C). In the H3 
specifications, I regress each of the governance structure variables on the residual goodwill measures. I 
include variables to control for the allocation of the purchase price amongst tangible assets, intangible 
assets and in-process research & development (PURCH_TANA, PURCH_INTAN, and PURCH_IPRD). 
In specification (1) and (2) of the H3 regressions the dependent measure is the Henning et al. (2000) 
residual goodwill measure (RESID_GDWL_H). In specifications (3) and (4), I include the Shalev (2009) 
residual goodwill measure (RESID_GDWL_S) as the dependent variable. Since the Shalev residual 
goodwill measure is constructed differently from the Henning et al. residual goodwill measure, I do not 
include the other goodwill elements and purchase price allocation variables as control variables in 
specifications (3) and (4). Also, I include the TLTF control variables summarized in Table 8, Panel B in 
specifications (2) and (4). 
 In specification (1) I document a significant, positive association between RESID_GDWL and 
both PURCH_NA and PURCH_INTAN, indicating the residual goodwill increases in the size of the 
acquisition and the magnitude/intensity of intangible assets acquired. In addition, I observe a significant 
negative association between PURCH_IPRD and RESID_GDWL. Under SFAS 141, the amount of the 
purchase price allocated to in-process research and development (IPR&D) is expensed in an acquisition. 
Since goodwill is no longer amortized under SFAS142, there could be incentive for managers to 
understate the amount of IPR&D and overstate goodwill. The observed association between residual 
goodwill and IPR&D may be indicative of this behavior. Surprisingly, none of the three governance 
structure test variables appear to be significantly associated with RESID_GDWL in specification (1). 
 Specification (2) adds the TLTF control variables to the specification (1) model. The associations 
between the purchase price allocation variables and RESID_GDWL are the same as described above. 
Specification (2) also provides marginal evidence that residual goodwill declines when the target and 
acquiring firms are in the same industry (SAMEIND) and that residual goodwill increases when the 
target-firm CEO retires (TC_RETIRE). In addition, the results indicate a marginally significant positive 
association between RESID_GDWL and OUTSIDEMON. This finding provides limited evidence that 
residual goodwill increases with the strength of external monitoring mechanisms, which is more likely to 
be related to the consideration element of residual goodwill. I provide an expanded analysis in which I 
attempt to further disentangle the consideration and purchase price elements of residual goodwill in 
Section 6.E. below. 
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 I next perform the H3 tests using the RESID_GDWL_S measure as the dependent variable. The 
results of specification (3) indicate a significant positive association between AGENCY and 
RESID_GDWL_S. Further, this association holds when the TLTF control variables are included in 
specification (4). Recall that the RESID_GDWL_S measure includes analyst long-term growth forecasts 
for the acquiring firm, implying that this measure may better capture the effects that increased pressure to 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts might have on the association between the governance structure measures 
and residual goodwill. To the extent this pressure leads managers to pursue value-decreasing mergers to 
conceal slower than expected growth, the observed association could be indicative of overpayment in the 
acquisition leading to higher residual goodwill (purchase price element). This finding could also be 
interpreted as providing support for Louis (2004), who shows that managers may manage earnings in 
advance of an acquisition in order to increase the share price. The inclusion of over-priced shares as part 
of the total consideration offered to complete an acquisition will lead to higher residual goodwill 
(consideration element).  
 In specification (4), I also find that EQTYPP is positively associated with RESID_GDWL_S. 
This is to be expected as acquiring firms are more likely to use over-priced shares in M&A, resulting in 
higher residual goodwill pertaining to the consideration element. As is the case with specification (2), I 
observe a negative association between RESID_GDWL_S and SAMEIND. However, the observed 
association between RESID_GDWL_S and TC_RETIRE is negative, while it was positive and significant 
in specification (2). 
 In summary, I observe a significant association between potential agency conflicts and residual 
goodwill that varies dependent on the setting and residual goodwill variable used. Thus, I view the 
collective evidence as providing limited support for H3b. I fail to provide consistent support for H3a 
suggesting that internal and external monitoring mechanisms have little impact on residual goodwill 
based on the sample of acquisitions that form the basis for these analyses. 
 The H4 tests examine whether investors’ perceptions of residual goodwill vary dependent on 
potential agency conflicts and the strength of internal/external monitoring mechanisms. In specification 
(1), I perform a baseline analysis similar to Henning et al. (2000), while also including the INC measure 
from the H2 regressions. Consistent with the observed results of the H2 regression, MVE is positively 
associated with ALGDWL and negatively associated with LIAB. Investors value OTH_GDWL, however 
none of the decomposed goodwill elements are found to be significantly associated with MVE2. Recall 
that the acquiring firms tend to be large firms, so it may be that the acquisitions are not significant enough 
to affect shareholders’ valuation assessments. Focusing on residual goodwill specifically, it is also 
possible that divergent investors’ perceptions based on the firm’s governance environment result in this 
 41
net zero finding. Thus, in specification (2) I include the governance measures and interaction variables 
necessary to examine how investors’ perceptions of goodwill may differ between the eight 
agency/monitoring groupings. 
 The results of specification (2) suggest that investors’ perceptions of residual goodwill vary based 
on the governance environment in which the acquiring firm operates. The main interaction effects 
indicate a reliably positive association between STROMONxR_GDWL and MVE2. This finding suggests 
that investors value residual goodwill more strongly when monitoring by outside institutions 
(blockholders and activist institutions) is stronger. Further I observe a marginally significant negative 
association between HIGHAGExR_GDWL and MVE2, suggesting that investors are more likely to 
discount residual goodwill as potential agency conflicts increase. The corresponding joint tests described 
in Table 10, Panel C, reveal two additional interesting results. First, absent strong internal and external 
monitoring mechanisms, I observe a negative association between residual goodwill and market value 
when agency conflicts are high. This finding suggests that managers are more likely to pursue a value-
decreasing acquisition (implying an overpayment) when agency conflicts are high and monitoring 
mechanisms are more likely to be ineffective. Consistent with the findings of Henning et al. (2000), 
investors discount the resulting residual goodwill as it implies little future economic benefit and may even 
provide a signal to investors that the management team has completed a lower quality acquisition. It is 
interesting to note that this association does not persist in the remaining high agency groupings as the 
strength of monitoring mechanisms increase. Second, I observe a positive association between residual 
goodwill and MVE in the presence of strong internal and external monitoring mechanisms and low 
potential agency conflicts. This finding extends the Henning et al. (2000) study by showing that investors’ 
perceptions of residual goodwill will not always be pessimistic. In fact, investors may be optimistic about 
this element of goodwill allocated in an acquisition to the extent it represents instances where savvy 
managers have been able to convert over-priced equity into assets that can be used to fuel positive future 
growth for the acquiring firm. 
 In specification (3), I re-estimate the specification (2) model and include the TLTF variables as 
additional controls. I note that the specification (2) results are robust to the inclusion of these additional 
control variables. I also perform similar analyses using the alternative RESID_GDWL_S measure, but 
found the results to be largely inconclusive. This is likely because this measure is fundamentally different 
in its construction from the RESID_GDWL_H measure. The RESID_GDWL_H measure allows for the 
calculation of an estimated dollar amount attributable to residual goodwill, which would be expected to 
have some economic impact on the corresponding market value. However, the RESID_GDWL_S 
measure does not capture economic elements of residual goodwill as the measure itself is constructed 
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using residuals from a regression model. Therefore it is not surprising that the model would yield 
inconclusive results given that the residual estimates for residual goodwill should not have any bearing on 
firm market value. Overall, the results of the H4 tests provide some support for H4a and marginal support 
for H4b, suggesting that investors’ perceptions of residual goodwill vary according to potential agency 
conflicts and the strength of external monitoring mechanisms. 
 
C. Sensitivity Analyses 
 I perform several different sensitivity analyses in order to test whether the findings described in 
the preceding sections are robust to a variety of alternative specifications, methods and approaches. I 
categorize these sensitivity analyses into four groupings based on the hypotheses tests to which they 
relate: (i) sensitivity analyses performed on all of the hypotheses tests; (ii) sensitivity analyses pertaining 
to potential endogeneity issues; (iii) sensitivity analyses performed on both of the investors’ perceptions 
tests (aggregate and residual goodwill); and (iv) sensitivity analyses performed specifically on the tests of 
investors’ perceptions of residual goodwill. 
 
i. Sensitivity analyses performed on all of the hypotheses tests (H1-H4) 
 An alternative approach in constructing the PCA based governance measures is to use the 
standardized factor scores to calculate each governance component instead of the standardized values of 
each underlying governance variable. I adopt this approach as a second alternative governance measure 
and find that the reported results hold in each of the analyses when factor scores are used as a basis for 
constructing the agency and monitoring measures. As a second sensitivity test, I perform the four 
hypotheses tests on a restricted “constant” sample of firms that are included in each of the four sample 
years and find the results are quantitatively similar in each of the analyses to those presented above. 
 
ii. Sensitivity analyses pertaining to potential endogeneity issues (H1 and H3) 
 As I discussed previously, endogeneity is a critical issue confronting all governance research. 
Although I am able to control for the impact of firm-specific endogenous choice factors that do not 
change over time in the H1 tests using the fixed-effects OLS regression technique, I cannot control for 
endogenous factors that change over time. In addition, I do not employ the fixed-effects regression in the 
H3 analyses due to the restricted sample size. Thus, to further assess the likelihood that the results are 
induced by the inclusion of the endogenous inside monitoring variable, I conduct a Hausman test 
(Hausman 1978). In this two-stage test, I first specify INSIDEMON as the dependent variable, predicted 
by the remaining variables in Table 7, Panel A, plus additional variables that may also be associated with 
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OUTSIDEMON, but that are not expected to be associated with goodwill balances (i.e. instrumental 
variables). I choose company age and return on assets (ROA) as the two instrumental variables for the 
first stage model. First, I choose company age because a company is likely to implement different 
monitoring mechanisms depending on the stage of its development (for which company age should serve 
as a proxy). Second, ROA should capture how differences in the business operating environment may 
influence the implementation of monitoring mechanisms. To perform the Hausman test, I save the 
residuals from this first-stage regression – which represent the uncontrolled determinants of INSIDEMON 
– and re-run the original regression specifications with the residuals included in the model.41 
 In the Hausman test for the H1 analyses, the coefficients of both instrumental variables are 
significant suggesting a negative association between these variables and INSIDEMON. In the second 
stage, the residual is not significant (p = 0.328), and the overall model significance does not improve, 
suggesting that inside monitoring does not appear to be endogenously determined.  Turning to the 
Hausman test for the H3 analyses, I note that neither of the instrumental variables is significantly 
associated with INSIDEMON.  This could be due to the reduced variation I note in the residual goodwill 
subsample firms. Also, I note that the other variables included in addition to the instrumental variables 
pertain to the specific acquisition transaction which would not be expected to be theoretical predictors of 
INSIDEMON. Unsurprisingly, I find this model to be a substantially weaker model of INSIDEMON. 
Once again, I capture the residuals from this first-stage regression and include them as an additional 
variable in the second stage regression on the determinants of residual goodwill. The corresponding 
coefficient is insignificant (p=0.524) and the primary regression model significance and results do not 
change.  
 Given the weaker results for the first-stage analysis of the H3 Hausman test, I perform a 
secondary test in which I use the residuals from the first-stage regression of the H1 Hausman test. Given 
that these residuals are calculated using a broader sample of firms, it is possible that they more accurately 
capture the true uncontrolled determinants of INSIDEMON. Once again, I find the coefficient on the 
residuals to be insignificant (p=0.835) and the regression results unchanged from the main analyses 
results. As a final sensitivity analyses, I use the xtivreg and ivreg commands in Stata to perform a two-
stage analysis using the instrumental variables described above and find the results do not change 
materially from those originally reported. Overall, I conclude that the results related to the INSIDEMON 
variable presented in the H1 and H3 tests are robust to potential endogeneity issues. 
 
                                                 
41 Specifically, I base the Hausman tests on specification (3) for the H1 tests presented in Table 7, Panel A and on 
specification (1) for the H3 tests presented in Table 10, Panel A. 
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iii. Sensitivity analyses performed on both of the investors’ perceptions tests (H2 & H4) 
 As a primary sensitivity analysis, I adjust how I define the high agency and strong monitoring 
groups. Recall in the primary tests that the groupings are distinguished at the 66th percentiles. To ensure 
the results I describe are robust to alternative grouping criteria, I also use 75% and 50% as the breakpoints 
in sensitivity analyses. Maintaining a focus on the high agency and strong monitoring groupings, I find 
that the results are even stronger when the groupings are made at the quartiles. When the break is made at 
the median, the results generally hold but are weaker. These findings are not surprising as quartiles 
(medians) provide more (less) refined distinctions of the agency and monitoring groups. Overall, the 
findings do not seem to indicate that the results are induced through the definition of the group 
breakpoints. 
 Additionally, I note that McCarthy and Schneider (1995) perform a sensitivity test in which they 
employ an alternate income measure. They obtain similar results using a clean surplus income measure in 
place of the unexpected income measure I use in my primary H2 and H4 tests. Thus, I replace INC with 
this clean surplus measure of income and reperform the H2 and H4 analyses noting the primary findings 
are unchanged as a result. 42 Noting that Henning et al. (2000) do not include an income measure in their 
tests of investors’ perceptions of goodwill, I also run the regressions with the income variable dropped 
altogether and the results do not change. Finally, as I mention above, I combine ALGDWL and LIAB to 
form a NETALGDWL measure to reduce the effects of multicollinearity on the H2 and H4 models and 
obtain results that are quantitatively similar to those reported in the original analyses. 
 
iv. Sensitivity analyses performed on investors’ perceptions of residual goodwill tests (H4) 
 Given the complexities inherent in the H4 regression analyses, there are a number of alternative 
specifications that may affect the results. First, I identify an alternative date to calculate MVE (the 
dependent variable) defined as the acquiring firm’s market value 6 days after the first public disclosure of 
the acquisition. Using this specification, I note that the main effects for AGENCY and OUTSIDEMON 
are significantly negative and positive, respectively, and the joint tests suggest a positive association 
between residual goodwill and this alternative MVE measure in all of the low agency groupings (except 
when internal and external monitoring mechanisms are weak). It is important to note that this MVE 
specification does not imply disclosure in the audited 10-K so there may be reporting differences that 
create noise in the estimation.  
                                                 
42 Consistent with McCarthy and Schneider (1995), I define clean surplus income as the change in book value from 
the prior year plus dividends paid during the year. 
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 Second, when coding the purchase price allocations, I note there were 19 instances where 
goodwill was pooled across several acquisitions. In these cases, I estimated goodwill using the relative 
weight of the sample acquisition relative to the total firm-wide acquisition activity for the year. Where 
possible, I was able to identify the goodwill allocated to a particular operating segment during the year, 
which allowed for more precise estimation. However, I re-estimate the base H4 models on the subsample 
of firms where goodwill was reported separately in the purchase price allocation (n=170). Despite the 
reduced sample size, the results are slightly stronger when these 19 firms are excluded from the analyses. 
 Finally, I note that 24 firms engage in multiple acquisitions during the 2004-2007 sample period 
(representing a total of 54 acquisitions). To ensure that the findings are not driven by these multiple 
acquisition firms, I drop them and re-estimate the H4 regressions on a reduced sample of 135 acquisitions. 
The results hold on this reduced sample of firms indicating that the results are not driven by the multiple 
acquisition firms. 
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6. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
A. High goodwill industries 
 I note that the incentives to engage in M&A may be different in industries where M&A activity is 
more common and so I run the H1 and H2 regressions on a sample broken out into high/low industry 
M&A activity splits as I describe in the footnotes to Table 2. This table also identifies the industries 
(listed in bold) that I classify as being High M&A activity industries. Admittedly, using goodwill to 
measure industry specific merger activity is a rough estimation, however I note that 63% of the residual 
goodwill sample acquisitions occurred between firms operating within the same industry. Therefore, 
industries in which a greater number of firms have goodwill balances should provide an approximation of 
industry-wide merger activity.  
 The results of basic H1 regression specification split on industry M&A activity (untabulated) 
suggest that market share (MKTSHR) is significantly, positively associated with aggregate goodwill 
(GDWL) for the low M&A industry firms. This is an interesting finding because MKTSHR was found be 
only marginally associated with GDWL in one of the original four regression specifications. Further, I 
note that this association does not hold for the high M&A industry firms, suggesting that the marginal 
significance noted in specification (3) is driven by the low M&A industry firms. In theory, goodwill 
should be associated with market share as increasing market share represents the ability for a firm to 
derive greater synergies from its operations and earn superior returns based on this dominant market 
presence. However, such a scenario may also involve instances where managers of more dominant firms 
are able to further entrench themselves by pursuing “empire-building” acquisitions. I turn to the H2 
regressions in an attempt to distinguish between these two competing views. 
 Splitting the H2 regressions based on the levels of industry-wide M&A activity (untabulated) 
reveal that the negative coefficient on HIGHAGExGDWL is driven by firms in low M&A activity 
industries. In addition, the coefficient on STRIMONxGDWL is negative and significant indicating the 
investors further incrementally discount goodwill in valuing the firm when internal monitoring is strong. 
This is an intriguing finding which may warrant future research. I note that agency conflicts do not lead 
investors to discount goodwill in high M&A activity industries.  
 Altogether, I view the results as evidence of the differing sets of motivations for firms in high and 
low M&A activity industries. In low M&A activity industries, it appears as though managers of dominant 
firms are likely to use M&A as a means to further entrench themselves and that shareholders react by 
discounting the firm’s shares as a result. In high M&A activities, acquisitions appear to be viewed more 
favorably by investors as these acquisitions tend to be more common and thus, acquiring firms may be 
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better equipped to integrate the target firm’s business activities after the merger, driving stronger 
performance post-merger. Given that most of the high M&A activity industries tend to be in technology-
intensive environments, these acquisitions may also be viewed as an acceptable means of staking claim to 
new technologies that are expected to provide future benefits to shareholders. 
  
B. Other goodwill elements (SYN/GC) 
 It is possible that the three distinct goodwill elements I measure (SYN_, GC_, and 
RESID_GDWL) have unique sets of determinants. Therefore, I perform additional tests of the 
determinants of the SYN_GDWL and GC_GDWL elements in order to better illustrate the determinants 
of aggregate goodwill. To do this, I re-run the H3 regressions after interchanging GC_GDWL (or 
SYN_GDWL) with RESID_GDWL while keeping the rest of the regression structure and control 
variables unchanged from the original specifications. Unlike with the RESID_GDWL component of 
goodwill, the results of the GC_GDWL determinants regression (untabulated) indicate that there is no 
significant association between GC_GDWL and acquisition size and the intensity of intangible assets 
acquired. Interestingly, there is a significant negative association (p<0.10) between MKTSHR and 
GC_GDWL and a strong positive association between AGENCY and GC_GDWL (p<0.01). While only 
conjecture, this finding implies that the going concern element of goodwill may be capturing acquisitions 
that are used to grow a firm that is lagging market leaders (explaining the negative association between 
MKTSHR and GC_GDWL). Further, the strong positive association between GC_GDWL and AGENCY 
suggests that these types of mergers may be used as an entrenchment mechanism by managers. I also note 
a strong positive association between GC_GDWL and the LONGCLOSE indicator suggesting 
acquisitions resulting in higher GC_GDWL tend to be subject to protracted negotiations, which may be 
indicative of hostile bids. Shifting focus to the SYN_GDWL component, I find the determinants are very 
similar to those noted in the main RESID_GDWL analysis. SYN_GDWL is increasing in the size of the 
acquisition (PURCH_NA) and in the value of intangible assets (PURCH_INTAN) acquired and 
decreasing in in-process research and development (PURCH_IPRD). This finding suggests that 
SYN_GDWL and RESID_GDWL are more similar than not when governance structures are factored in. 
However, a more thorough analysis comparing and contrasting the various goodwill elements in different 
scenarios would be an interesting topic for future research, and I elaborate on this point in Section 7.C. 
 
C. Internal Controls Analysis 
 I am also interested in how the operation of a firm’s system of internal controls may impact the 
allocation of goodwill in an acquisition. I obtain data on internal control opinions now required under 
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Section 404 of SOX for 785 of the 904 sample firms. Of these firms, 143 firms report adverse internal 
control opinions, representing 193 unique firm-years. I note only 11 of the adverse internal control 
opinion firm-year observations are subsequently included in the residual goodwill sample. I run two 
separate sets of analyses based on the internal control opinion data. First, I drop all firm year observations 
where an adverse internal control opinion is reported and re-run the main regression specifications testing 
H1-H4. In each case, I obtain results (untabulated) that are unchanged from the original analysis, 
indicating that the results are not sensitive to the exclusion of firms reporting internal control weaknesses. 
Second, I re-run the H1 goodwill determinants tests with an indicator for whether the firm reported an 
internal control weakness in the given year to test whether an association exists between aggregate 
goodwill balances and internal control weaknesses. These (untabulated) regressions do not appear to 
indicate that aggregate goodwill is associated with the operation of a firm’s internal control systems. 
 
D. Hostile versus friendly takeovers 
 Shivdasani (1993) distinguishes between hostile and friendly takeovers in his investigation of 
board effectiveness. It is possible that unique characteristics between hostile and friendly acquisitions 
may impact residual goodwill balances. Therefore, I classify acquisitions as being either hostile or 
friendly using a similar method as Shivdasani. An acquisition is considered to be hostile if the target 
board rejects or does not respond to the initial offer and the merger is considered to be friendly otherwise. 
I note that only five of the sample acquisitions are classified as hostile making rigorous analysis difficult. 
I compare the average residual goodwill balances of the five hostile takeover firms and remaining friendly 
acquisitions noting no statistical difference (p-value=0.98). In addition, I drop these five firms and re-run 
the H3 and H4 regression analyses noting no differences in results. Based on these limited procedures, it 
does not appear as though residual goodwill balances differ between hostile and friendly acquisitions; nor 
does it appear as though investors’ perceptions of residual goodwill differ depending on whether the 
acquisition is hostile or friendly. 
 
E. Acquisitions involving the exchange of equity consideration 
 In the main H3 and H4 tests, I provide new evidence suggesting that the composition and 
investors’ perceptions of residual goodwill differ based on the governance environment in which a 
company operates. In addition, I provide evidence in the H4 tests that investors may assign a positive 
valuation weight to residual goodwill when monitoring is high, suggesting that managers may 
opportunistically convert over-priced shares into tangible assets through an acquisition (i.e., the 
consideration element of residual goodwill). In an attempt to disentangle these two residual goodwill 
 49
elements further, I re-estimate the H3 specification (2) model on a subsample of the residual goodwill 
sample acquisitions where equity is included as part of the purchase price (untabulated; n=90). I do so 
because I want to examine whether there is an association between governance structures and the 
consideration element of residual goodwill. The consideration element requires the exchange of equity as 
a part of the purchase price and so these acquisitions represent a subset of the acquisitions where the 
consideration element must be considered in interpreting residual goodwill. On this subset of acquisitions 
I observe a significant negative association between AGENCY and RESID_GDWL_H (p-value <0.05). 
This finding suggests that, absent potential agency conflicts, firms may opportunistically use over-priced 
shares to pursue acquisitions. Further, this finding does not hold for the subset of firms completing all 
cash acquisitions. These findings coupled with the results of the H4 analyses presented above provide 
new evidence that residual goodwill does not merely reflect possible overpayment in an acquisition. 
Instead, residual goodwill may also capture the benefits accruing to acquiring firm shareholders in the 
event the company can complete a merger using over-priced equity. Again, these findings highlight the 
complexity of residual goodwill and suggest that governance and other environmental factors need to be 
considered when assessing the quality of allocated (residual) goodwill. 
 
F. Current year changes in goodwill 
  In the H1 and H2 tests, I focus on aggregate goodwill as a rough proxy for a firm’s acquisition 
activity. Previous research has shown that older goodwill balances are perceived different than relatively 
newer goodwill balances (Henning et al. 2000; Bugeja and Gallery 2006). I re-perform the H1 and H2 
analyses (in untabulated tests) to examine how the results may be influenced by a firm’s previous 
acquisitions activity. To do so, I split total goodwill balances into current year goodwill changes 
(CURRGDWL) and prior year goodwill balances (PYGDWL). In re-performing the H1 analyses, I use 
CURRGDWL as the dependent variable and find that the coefficients on PYGDWL and OUTSIDEMON 
are significant and negative (p=0.00 and p=0.02 respectively). I also document a significantly positive 
association between CURRGDWL and AGENCY. While I must caveat that negative current goodwill 
changes (impairments) are included in this analysis, the results suggest that outside monitoring is 
negatively associated with current goodwill allocations whereas agency conflicts appear to be positively 
associated with current year goodwill. These findings appear to be consistent with (and relatively stronger 
than) the main results obtained using aggregate goodwill, which is to be expected given the refinement in 
splitting aggregate goodwill into its current year and prior year components. 
 In re-performing the H2 analyses, I retain MVE as the dependent variable but split goodwill into 
its PYGDWL and CURRGDWL components to examine whether investors’ perceptions differ between 
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relatively newer and older goodwill while considering the moderating effects of the governance 
environment. I find the results are very consistent with the main H2 findings where only high potential 
agency conflicts appear to have a moderating effect on shareholders’ perceptions of goodwill. Further, the 
regression results suggest that this result is driven by the prior year interaction term 
HIGHAGExPYGDWL (p=0.02), whereas the interaction coefficient on HIGHAGExCURRGDWL is not 
significant (p=0.25). 
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7. LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND SYNTHESIS OF FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
A. Limitations 
 Like any empirical examination, this study is subject to a number of limitations. I try to address 
these limitations where possible, but many are related to the availability of data and the nature of the 
transactions from which I draw my sample and are thus largely unavoidable. That my samples (especially 
the residual goodwill sample) may not be representative of all firms or all acquisitions is certainly an 
important limitation as it restricts my ability to generalize the findings to the full population of firms and 
M&A transactions.43 In particular, I note that certain of the H1 and H2 findings do not hold in the residual 
goodwill sample used to test H3 and H4, likely due to the fact the residual goodwill sample firms are 
substantially larger (as is illustrated in Table 3, Panel B). Overall, I find the H3 and H4 test results to be 
more interesting and cohesive as I am able to focus on a more precise measure of goodwill. But, given the 
distinct nature of the set of M&A transactions I study, these results may not generalize to all acquisitions.  
 Further, the aggregate goodwill measure used in the H1 and H2 analyses provides only a rough 
measure of a firm’s M&A activities relative to its governance structures, raising two additional 
limitations. First, aggregate goodwill balances represent collective allocations through past transactions, 
which may or may not be matched with the corresponding governance structures I measure during the 
four-year sample period. Second, perceptions of aggregate goodwill may differ depending on whether the 
goodwill was allocated prior to the issuance of SFAS141 and would have been subject to amortization 
prior to 2001.  
 Countering some of the potential issues raised with these limitations are the findings of Henning, 
et al. (2000) and Bugeja and Gallery (2006) who find that older goodwill tends to be weighted less by 
investors in valuing the firm. Thus, I would expect the older goodwill balances are less likely to be 
driving the results than goodwill acquired more recently. To ensure there were not any drastic changes in 
goodwill activity surrounding the passage of SFAS141, I perform an analysis on 394 sample firms with 
goodwill information available for 2000-2007. I note that the ratio of goodwill to total assets for these 
firms increases from 14.5% in 2000 to 17.8% in 2004. Further, the change around the passage of SFAS 
141 in 2001 appears to be relatively modest as firms report goodwill totaling 15.7% of assets in 2001 and 
16.5% of assets in 2002. Overall, there appears to be a steady trend upwards in the proportion of goodwill 
to total assets, but I do not observe any significant changes which might suggest that investors’ would 
                                                 
43 Here the full population of firms would be the 7,912 firm year observations described on the “Screened 
Compustat sample” line in Table 1. The population of M&A should also include the M&A involving private targets, 
however I could not identify a suitable measure for estimating residual goodwill for private M&A similar to the 
RESID_GDWL_H measure I use in the primary regressions. 
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value goodwill very differently in the years following the passage of SFAS 141. In a final attempt to 
address these concerns, I re-perform the H1 and H2 analyses with a focus on current goodwill and find 
that the results of both tests are generally consistent with the main findings.  
 Another limitation of the study is the small number of firms in each of the eight sample groupings 
for the H4 residual goodwill analyses. Although I implement interaction terms to increase the power of 
the tests, the coefficient estimates are still based on a relatively small sample size overall (n=190), which 
may be compounded when these observations are split into the eight agency/monitoring groupings. In 
addition, I note that multicollinearity appears to be present in the H4 regressions, which would lead to 
increased variances and wider confidence intervals, making it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis. 
On the one hand, this makes the observation of a significant positive or negative association between 
MVE and the test variables (including joint tests) more convincing given multicollinearity would bias 
against finding results. On the other hand, this implies that the underlying data may suggest other 
important associations exist that are effectively masked by the observed multicollinearity issues.  
 Another possible limitation is in the execution of the H4 sample design. Specifically, the 
acquisitions included in the sample may not register as sufficiently important events with the acquiring 
firm’s investors to observe an association between the test variables and MVE. This is especially 
important in my sample given the substantial size differences between acquirer and target firms that I 
observe.44 In untabulated tests, I create an indicator variable for each of the acquisitions where the 
market-value based size comparison falls below the median (11.57). I then run the H4 regression on this 
subsample of firms where the acquirer is much closer in size to the target firm. As expected, the results 
are stronger in this specification given that the acquisition is much more important to the acquiring firms’ 
shareholders. I find that each of the governance interaction variables is significant. HIGHAGExR_GDWL 
is negatively associated with MVE2 (p-value<0.10) and both STRIMONxR_GDWL and 
STROMONxR_GDWL are positively associated with MVE2 (p-values of 0.091 and 0.005 respectively).  
 Overall, this supplementary analysis provides rather convincing evidence that governance does 
affect shareholders’ perceptions of residual goodwill consistent with H4. If agency costs are high, 
investors appear to perceive residual goodwill as reflecting a lower-quality acquisition and they discount 
this element of goodwill in valuing the firm. However, in the presence of effective monitoring 
mechanisms, shareholders assign a positive valuation weight to these elements suggesting, either (1) that 
managers at well-governed firms use over-priced shares to complete acquisitions at an effective discount 
(consideration element of residual goodwill); or (2) that investors are more optimistic about the abilities 
                                                 
44 Recall that acquirers are 66 times larger than the target firms, on average, measured using both market value of 
equity and assets. 
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of managers at well-governed firms to maximize the returns from the acquisition (whether through 
stronger monitoring or better managerial performance), even in cases where managers paid a merger 
premium (purchase price element).  
 Finally, despite my attempts to identify broad measures of a firm’s underlying governance 
structures, the measures I use are not expected to be perfect measures of a firm’s potential agency 
conflicts and the true quality/effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms. For instance, the six variables 
underlying the AGENCY measure are included because they indicate the possible presence of agency 
conflicts. It is important to caveat that variables such as SIZE and FCF are likely to be positively 
correlated with M&A, but do not necessarily indicate an agency problem. To the extent these (and other) 
governance structure variables are instead measuring some alternative underlying construct, the 
inferences I make may not be correct. 
 
B. Implications 
 Bearing in mind the limitations I describe in the preceding section, this study has several 
important implications. First, this study should help users of financial statements and standard setters 
assess whether goodwill balances provide useful information to market participants. In this way, the paper 
builds upon empirical work by Johnson and Petrone (1998) and Henning et al. (2000). Johnson and 
Petrone identify four distinct elements of goodwill and Henning et al. find that investors’ perceptions vary 
predictably amongst these elements. Overall, these two studies suggest that certain elements of goodwill 
do, indeed, imply future economic benefits to the firm and its shareholders (synergy and going concern 
components), whereas other elements do not appear to do so (purchase price and consideration elements, 
collectively defined as residual goodwill).  
 My study extends upon this work in two ways. First, my findings suggest that investors’ 
perceptions of goodwill vary based on the governance environment in which a firm operates. Contrary to 
the findings of the Henning, et al study, I provide evidence that shareholders may assign a positive 
valuation weight to residual goodwill when monitoring is strong and potential agency conflicts are weak. 
Second, my study illustrates and provides some evidence to the opposing effects of the purchase price and 
consideration elements of residual goodwill. I note that important differences in these elements do not 
necessarily imply a negative valuation weight on the residual element of goodwill. By incorporating 
measures of potential agency conflicts and monitoring structures in my tests, I am able to disentangle 
these two elements of residual goodwill to some degree. In this way, my study should help foster a 
broader understanding of goodwill. 
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  I believe that a broader understanding of this important asset is important for two reasons. First, 
recent global market declines have led to a dramatic increase in the number of goodwill impairments. 
Unsurprisingly, academics have been quick to follow this trend and there have been a number of goodwill 
impairment studies that have emerged in recent years. A working paper by Chambers (2007) asks whether 
goodwill reporting under SFAS 142 has improved financial reporting. His findings suggest while annual 
impairment testing did improve the quality of financial reporting, the elimination of systematic 
amortization reduced financial reporting quality. A second working paper by Gu and Lev (2008) adopts a 
similar framework as my study to investigate goodwill impairments. The authors provide convincing 
evidence that the practice of using over-priced shares to fund acquisitions is a significant predictor of 
future goodwill impairments. My study focuses on the allocation and investors’ perception of goodwill 
and in so doing, provides information that may be useful to academics in analyzing subsequent goodwill 
impairment decisions. 
 Finally, this study ties together important elements in financial reporting and corporate 
governance that have an impact on several academic disciplines, particularly accounting, finance and 
management sciences. I adopt a governance framework for analyzing goodwill and provide marginal 
evidence that goodwill captures elements of a firm’s governance environment in the context of M&A. 
Further, I leverage my accounting knowledge of the goodwill account to provide unique evidence that 
investors’ reactions to mergers vary depending on the potential agency conflicts and monitoring 
mechanisms that interact in the completion of a merger. 
 
C. Future Research Synthesis 
 There are several interesting avenues for future research that emerge from this study. First, it 
would be interesting to develop an economic residual goodwill measure (e.g. Henning et al. (2000)) that 
can be equally applied in both public and private acquisitions. While the Shalev (2009) measure can be 
applied to the acquisition of the private firm, I note that it is not easily incorporated in economic analyses 
such as the ones I perform in this study. Development of a new residual goodwill measure would allow 
for equivalent analysis of public and private targets, which should help to further identify distinctions 
amongst the four goodwill components. 
 I perform limited analyses regarding the determinants of going concern and synergy goodwill. It 
may be interesting to perform a more robust examination of these elements of goodwill, especially within 
a governance context as they suggest differing motivations and incentives for acquiring firms.  In the 
future, I may be able to further extend these analyses to examine whether investors’ perceptions vary 
based on firm operating environment and corporate governance structures. I can also envision a study 
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which includes firm operating performance measures to evaluate whether the distinct goodwill elements 
are associated with future accounting returns as is implied in the initial allocation of goodwill. Once 
again, governance structures may have an interactive effect in the association between goodwill elements 
and future firm operating performance. 
 Finally, the limited analyses I perform on “high vs. low M&A” industries had several interesting 
findings that encourage a more thorough investigation. In particular, it would be interesting to examine 
how goodwill balances differ across industries. Although I control for industry effects in these analyses, I 
do not investigate industry effects themselves. I would expect that goodwill balances are fundamentally 
different for a company like Coca-Cola compared to a pharmaceutical company such as Abbott 
Laboratories. Future research that helps illustrate these differences may lead to an even deeper 
understanding of this unique and important asset. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLES 
 
Table 1 - Sample Selection and Composition 
 
Panel A: Full Goodwill Sample Construction 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
 Full population of Compustat firms 5,953 5,855 5,717 5,548 23,073 
(Less): Foreign registrants (825) (823) (819) (786) (3,253) 
 Firms not listed on a primary U.S. 
exchange1 
(619) (521) (427) (334) (1,901) 
 Non-accelerated filers2 (835) (788) (652) (722) (2,997) 
 Financial services institutions3 (886) (923) (906) (832) (3,547) 
 Screened Compustat sample 2,788 2,800 2,913 2,874 11,375 
 Missing or zero goodwill value(s) (875) (835) (874) (879) (3,463) 
 Goodwill Sample in Compustat 1,913 1,965 2,039 1,995 7,912 
 Firm not included in governance dataset(s)4 (1,028) (1,030) (1,059) (1,052) (4,169) 
 Missing governance variables (116) (107) (138) (125) (486) 
 Non Big-4 auditor (18) (25) (30) (35) (108) 
 Aggregate sample for H1 and H2 tests5 751 803 812 783 3,149 
 
 
Panel B: Residual Goodwill Sample Construction 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
 Possible acquisitions identified in CRSP - - - - 305 
(Less): Acquisitions not closing during 2004-07 - - - - (83) 
 Acquisitions closing during 2004-07 41 52 65 64 222 
(Less): Multiple acquisitions during fiscal year (2) (4) (10) (6) (22) 
 No purchase price allocation provided (2) (2) (2) (2) (8) 
 Missing returns data for residual goodwill (-)   (-) (1) (1) (2) 
 Residual sample for H3 and H4 tests5 37 46 52 55 190 
 
 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Panel C: Number of Firms Included in Sample 
  Full Sample Residual Sample
 Maximum Firm Years 3,149 190 
 Maximum Unique Firms: 904 160 
  - Represented in one year 56 3 
  - Represented in two years 93 14 
  - Represented in three years 113 17 
  - Represented in four years (constant sample) 642 126 
 
 
Panel D: Breakdown of Observations into Agency/Monitoring Groupings 
Agency Conflicts 
(High/Low) 
Internal 
(Strong/Weak) 
External 
(Strong/Weak) 
Full Sample 
(n = 3,149) 
Residual Sample
(n = 190) 
Low Weak Weak 940 31 
Low Strong Weak 432 29 
Low Weak Strong 462 27 
Low Strong Strong 244 11 
High Weak Weak 462 33 
High Strong Weak 244 39 
High Weak Strong 214 10 
High Strong Strong 151 10 
                                                 
Panel A provides details into the sampling approach and screens applied to derive the full sample used to test H1 
and H2. Panel B contains information on the sampling approach undertaken to derive the residual sample used to 
test H3 and H4. Panel C highlights the distribution of firms throughout the four-year sample period (2004-2007). 
Panel D displays the breakdown of the firms into each of the 8 agency conflict/monitoring groupings which are 
utilized in the H2 & H4 regression analyses. 
1 Primary exchanges are considered to be the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges. 
2 Consistent with the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), non-accelerated filers are defined as those firms 
with a market capitalization below $75 million for the year. 
3 Financial services institutions are defined as firms with SIC codes ranging from 6000-6999. 
4 Governance variables are obtained from Board Analyst, RiskMetrics/IRRC, CompuStat Quarterly, Spectrum and 
Execucomp. The majority of this data attrition is due to lack of reporting by Board Analyst (resulting in the 
exclusion of 3,929 firm-year observations). 
5 The income variable to be included in the market value of equity regressions is missing for a handful of 
observations, resulting in a slightly reduced sample size for the H2 and H4 analyses. 
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Table 2 - Sample Industry Composition 
 ($ Millions for Goodwill Balances) 
 
Panel A: Full Sample Industry Composition and Comparison to Compustat Cross-Section 
          Goodwill Balances2 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  Number  
Percent of
Sample  
Compustat 
Composition1  Mean  Min  Max 
1  Crops  4  0.4 %  0.4%  759.4  4.2  2,625.0 
10  Ores  3   0.3  0.4  2,173.9  8.7  6,105.0 
12  Coal  2  0.2  0.3  79.6  37.4  240.7 
13  Oil & Gas3  24  2.6  3.5  654.0  1.5  6,172.0 
14  Quarry  4  0.4  0.2  541.2  20.6  3,789.1 
15  Building - Light  0  0.0  0.6  -  -  - 
16  Building - Heavy  6  0.7  0.3  200.0  9.9  626.7 
17  Construction  2  0.2  0.2  484.4  279.4  1,355.1 
20  Food3  29  3.2  2.2  2,603.4  20.2  31,193.0 
21  Tobacco  2  0.2  0.2  3,151.9  2.6  8,175.0 
22  Textile Mill  2  0.2  0.3  1,273.6  153.0  2,797.3 
23  Apparel  8  0.9  1.0  553.2  12.6  1,278.2 
24  Lumber  4  0.4  0.5  1,191.0  123.8  4,408.0 
25  Furniture  10  1.1  0.6  731.2  2.4  6,131.0 
26  Paper  17  1.9  0.9  1,109.1  2.8  5,043.0 
27  Printing  19  2.1  1.3  1,663.7  30.5  10,060.4 
28  Chemicals3  79  8.7  11.0  2,039.9  0.9  56,552.0 
29  Petroleum  10  1.1  0.5  3,733.3  34.9  31,488.0 
30  Rubber  12  1.3  1.1  447.0  10.1  2,608.7 
31  Leather  5  0.5  0.5  72.9  0.9  238.7 
32  Stone  6  0.7  0.5  540.6  9.3  3,009.1 
33  Metal Work - Basic  22  2.4  1.2  575.9  8.0  6,541.0 
34  Metal Work - Fabrication  16  1.7  1.4  915.5  42.7  4,345.6 
35  Industrial3  68  7.5  6.1  1,081.2  0.6  21,773.0 
36  Electrical3  88  9.7  9.6  576.1  0.5  8,165.1 
37  Transport - Equipment  23  2.5  2.3  2,364.2  24.8  16,120.0 
38  Instruments  72  8.0  7.8  1,192.3  2.6  17,672.0 
39  Misc. Manufacturing3  12  1.3  0.9  266.5  1.4  1,116.6 
          
          (Table continued on next page)
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          Goodwill Balances2 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  Number  
Percent of
Sample  
Compustat 
Composition1  Mean  Min  Max 
40  Railroad  2  0.2  0.3  34.8  10.6  73.0 
42  Motor Freight  9  1.0  0.9  681.5  4.8  2,577.0 
44  Water Transport  5  0.5  0.4  159.3  9.0  328.8 
45  Air Transport  2  0.2  0.7  1,499.1  8.4  3,497.0 
47  Transport – Services  5  0.5  0.4  135.8  7.8  380.5 
48  Communications3  15  1.6  3.6  11,053.9  4.8  70,713.0 
49  Utilities3  10  1.1  3.7  1,906.9  11.4  8,202.0 
50  Durables - Wholesale3  30  3.3  2.5  336.1  3.0  1,779.2 
51  NonDurables - Wholesale  11  1.2  1.4  1,045.7  4.2  4,866.1 
52  Garden  3  0.3  0.1  1,078.7  10.2  6,314.0 
53  General Stores  8  0.9  0.7  2,008.5  9.3  13,759.0 
54  Food Stores  7  0.8  0.5  1,303.7  8.2  5,921.0 
55  Auto Dealers  6  0.7  0.6  661.5  4.2  2,799.7 
56  Apparel – Retail  14  1.5  1.3  201.2  3.6  1,676.0 
57  Home Equipment  6  0.7  0.6  155.6  2.5  919.0 
58  Eating  18  2.0  1.7  251.0  1.6  2,301.3 
59  Misc. Retail  19  2.1  2.3  1,302.4  5.9  23,922.3 
70  Hotels  3  0.3  0.4  1,560.5  921.0  3,710.0 
72  Personal Services  4  0.4  0.4  702.0  25.1  1,264.3 
73  Business Services3  119  13.2  14.1  977.7  0.6  14,285.0 
75  Auto Repair  2  0.2  0.2  108.4  1.0  166.6 
78  Movies  2  0.2  0.5  450.0  11.2  1,138.5 
79  Amusements  4  0.4  1.1  383.7  26.7  1,314.6 
80  Health  25  2.8  2.1  850.2  1.7  5,220.1 
82  Educational  5  0.5  0.5  327.6  190.0  579.8 
83  Social  1  0.1  0.2  144.4  123.7  165.0 
87  Engineering - Retail  19  2.1  2.5  408.9  13.7  3,139.6 
99  Nonclassifiable  1  0.1  0.5  322.5  291.3  365.4 
    904  100.0  100.0  1,231.6  0.5  70,713.0 
 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Panel B: Residual Sample Industry Composition (Acquiring Firms)  
   Residual Goodwill Balances2 
2-Digit SIC Industry Number Mean Min Max 
1 Crops 1 25.5 25.5 25.5 
13 Oil & Gas3 8 176.5 0 387.5 
17 Construction 1 152.8 152.8 152.8 
20 Food 3 132.5 0 393.6 
23 Apparel 1 92.5 92.5 92.5 
25 Lumber 1 0 0 0 
26 Paper 2 251.0 166.66 335.3 
27 Printing 4 205.7 0 816.7 
28 Chemicals 18 427.4 0 9,662.9 
29 Petroleum 3 3,531.2 594.2 5,299.5 
31 Leather 1 0 0 0 
33 Metal Work - Basic 3 44.4 0 133.2 
34 Metal Work - Fabrication 1 0 0 0 
35 Industrial 12 278.9 0 1,708.0 
36 Electrical 20 156.7 0 1,308.0 
37 Transport-Equipment 4 319.8 0 733.8 
38 Instruments 20 130.4 0 1,262.0 
39 Misc. Manufacturing 2 0 0 0 
42 Motor Freight 1 0 0 0 
44 Water Transport 2 0 0 0 
48 Communications 6 1,124.4 0 5,833.8 
50 Durables - Wholesale 1 0 0 0 
51 NonDurables - Wholesale 3 278.6 0 851.7 
52 Garden 1 28.1 28.1 28.1 
54 Food Stores 2 6.3 0 18.4 
59 Misc. Retail 4 419.1 0 1,373.5 
72 Personal Services 1 96.9 96.9 96.9 
73 Business Services 27 203.3 0 2,394.5 
79 Amusements 1 0 0 0 
80 Health 3 871.8 121.2 2,044.0 
87 Engineering - Retail 3 356.4 20.4 773.7 
 Total 160 316.9 0 9,662.9 
 
                                                 
Panel A summarizes the industry composition (two-digit SIC codes) for the 904 unique sample firms in the full 
sample in addition to the mean, minimum and maximum goodwill balances by industry. Panel B provides an 
industry breakout for each of the 160 acquiring firms in the residual goodwill sample in addition to the mean, 
minimum and maximum residual goodwill balances by industry. 
1The Compustat composition figures are based on all U.S. based, non-financial firms included in the Compustat 
database (n=3,921) 
2 The figures presented here summarize the goodwill (residual goodwill) balances within each industry grouping and 
are based on the full sample of 3,149 (190) firm-year observations for consistency with descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 4. 
3 Denotes the industry is deemed to be a “high” M&A activity industry. This classification is assigned to any 
industry comprising more than 3% of either the full sample or the full population of Compustat firms. This 
classification is made based on the assumption that an industry with a greater number of firms reporting goodwill is 
indicative of higher levels of M&A activity. Where this classification is used, a tighter 5% criteria is also applied as 
a sensitivity analysis and inferences are unchanged as a result. 
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Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics: Governance and Financial Statement Variables 
 (Financial Statement Variables in Panel B in $ Millions)  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Governance Variables 
Ref  Variable1  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
  Agency Variables       
(A1)    SIZE  7.649  7.526  1.454 
(A2)    OWN  0.698  0.723  0.185 
(A3)    RISK  0.024  0.017  0.026 
(A4)    FCF  0.073  0.067  0.103 
(A5)    GROWTH2  0.426  0.374  0.245 
(A6)    LEV2  0.265  0.201  0.314 
  Outside Monitoring Variables       
(O1)    BLOCKHOLDER3  2.634  2.508  1.673 
(O2)    LRGSHRHLDR  0.110  0.108  0.045 
(O3)    BLOCKPCT  0.203  0.189  0.125 
(O4)    ACTIVIST3  11.082  11.000  2.259 
(O5)    ACTIVISTPCT  0.028  0.029  0.009 
  Inside Monitoring Variables       
(I1)    BD_UNAFFOUTSIDE  0.717  0.75  0.149 
(I2)    BD_SIZE4  9.258  9.000  2.149 
(I3)    BD_MTGS2  7.939  7.000  3.505 
(I4)    CEO_SHR2  0.950  1.000  0.219 
(I5)    CEO_TURN  0.373  0.000  0.484 
(I6)    BD_UNDER4  0.891  0.909  0.130 
(I7)    BD_NOTACTCEO  0.742  0.750  0.130 
(I8)    CEO_COB  0.391  0.000  0.488 
(I9)    FOUND_CEO  0.930  1.000  0.255 
(I10)    FOUND_BD  0.821  1.000  0.384 
(I11)    CEO_EBC  0.629  0.691  0.253 
(I12)    CEO_BONUS  0.130  0.070  0.163 
(I13)    POISON2  0.411  1.000  0.492 
(I14)    STATEINC  0.897  1.000  0.304 
(I15)    STAGBD  0.406  0.000  0.491 
(I16)    SUPER  0.829  1.000  0.376 
(I17)    UNEQVOTE  0.989  1.000  0.103 
 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics – Financial Statement Variables 
    Full Sample  (N=3,149) 6   Residual Sample  (N=190) 6 
Variable5  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
AT  6,916.30  1,883.32  17,538.75  20,661.84  6,778.68  39,697.07 
MVE  9,595.11  2,333.80  24,436.94  28,947.69  8,154.11  48,783.48 
GDWL  1,231.61  257.32  3,757.70  4,474.26  1,433.25  9,360.78 
LIAB  3,855.99  931.75  9,935.79  11,080.98  2,864.27  22,341.21 
XAD6  231.34  38.52  619.53  569.24  94.90  1,101.60 
XRD  179.42  10.02  707.23  785.83  97.02  1,694.95 
INTANLG  536.22  40.68  3,379.70  2,509.31  324.37  8,413.04 
TANA  5,148.47  1,399.50  12,843.86  13,678.26  4,191.63  25,484.58 
MKTSHR  0.19  0.09  0.24  0.21  0.11  0.25 
ALGDWL  5,739.86  1,543.26  15,010.12  16,187.57  4,714.50  31,908.76 
INC6  62.20  16.75  795.19  120.50  33.00  978.97 
 
 
                                                 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) for the 28 total governance 
variables which are used to derive the three governance measures: (1) AGENCY; (2) OUTSIDEMON; and (3) 
INSIDEMON. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the financial statement variables used in regression 
analyses, broken out between the full (n-3,149) and residual (n=190) samples. All financial statement variables are 
winsorized (1% and 99%) to reduce the impact of outlier observations and are scaled by common shares 
outstanding at year-end in subsequent regression analyses (excluding MKTSHR) consistent with Henning, et al. 
(2000). 
1 Governance variables are defined in Appendix C. 
2 These variables (GROWTH, LEV, BD_UNAFFOUTSIDE, BD_MTGS, CEO_SHR and POISON) did not load  
   significantly in PCA and are included in the calculation of the internal monitoring score individually (using  
   standardized values). 
3 ACTIVIST and BLOCKHOLDER variables are calculated as yearly averages based on quarterly 13-f filings and  
   thus, the variables may not be round numbers.  
4 BD_SIZE and will be multiplied by negative one (-1) to ensure consistent observation for PCA, as this variable is  
expected to be inversely associated with quality of internal monitoring (Dey 2008) 
5 Financial statement variables are defined in Appendix B with the exception of total assets (AT), which I include  
   here merely for reference purposes. 
6  Advertising expense (XAD) data is only available for 1,338 (81) observations in the full (residual) sample.   
   Unexpected income (INC) data is only available for 3,139 (189) observations in the full (residual) sample. 
7  RESID_GDWL_S is the Shalev (alternative) residual goodwill measure. This variable is only calculated for the 
   H3/H4 residual sample. Long-term analyst growth forecasts are required for the calculation of this alternative  
   residual goodwill measure and are obtained from I/B/E/S. Data is missing for seven of the residual sample firms,  
   leaving 183 observations for regression analyses involving this variable. 
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Table 4 - Governance Principle Component Analysis (PCA) Correlation Tables 
 
 
Panel A: Agency PCA Correlation Table – Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal1 
COMPONENT  INDEX  A1  A2  A3  A4  A5  A6 
SIZE  A1  -  0.24  -0.04*  0.10  -0.09  0.04* 
OWN  A2  0.27  -  -0.06  -0.01  -0.16  -0.11 
RISK  A3  -0.01  -0.08  -  0.18  -0.10  -0.13 
FCF  A4  0.17  0.05  0.18  -  -0.17  0.09 
GROWTH  A5  -0.11  -0.17  -0.12  -0.25  -  0.05 
LEV  A6   0.18  -0.03^  -0.21  0.06  0.07  - 
 
 
Panel B: External Monitoring PCA Correlation Table – Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal1 
COMPONENT  INDEX  O1  O2  O3  O4  O5  
BLOCKHOLDER  O1  -  0.38  0.81  -0.29  0.10  
LRGSHRHLDR  O2  0.49  -  0.66  -0.12  0.06  
BLOCKPCT  O3  0.91  0.71  -  -0.27  0.18  
ACTIVIST  O4  -0.35  -0.16  -0.30  -  0.19  
ACTIVISTPCT  O5  0.09  0.07  0.15  0.18  -  
 
 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Panel C: Internal Monitoring PCA Correlation Table: Spearman Correlations2 
 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 I10 I11 I12 I13 I14 I15 I16 
I2 -0.08 -               
I3 0.08 -0.00 -              
I4 0.14 -0.05 0.10 -             
I5 0.06 -0.07 0.10 0.12 -            
I6 -0.10 0.15  0.00 -0.05* -0.04* -           
I7 -0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.01  0.25 -          
I8 -0.17 0.02 0.11 0.10 0.16  0.09 0.14 -         
I9 0.11 -0.14 0.02 0.26 0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.14 -        
I10 0.21 -0.12 0.02 0.14 0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 0.59 -       
I11 0.15 -0.11 0.12 0.07 0.06  -0.03^  0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.02 -      
I12 -0.06 -0.05* -0.04* -0.03 0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.63 -     
I13 -0.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08  0.02 0.03^  0.03^ -0.03* -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -    
I14 -0.08 0.05  0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.04* -0.01 0.02 -   
I15 -0.04* 0.06 -0.00 0.02^ -0.06  0.01 -0.02  0.03^ -0.02 0.01 0.04* -0.06 0.24 0.08 -  
I16 -0.00 0.12  0.03 0.05* 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.04* -0.01 0.04*  -0.02 0.09 0.09 0.13 - 
I17 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.02  0.04* -0.01 -0.02 0.04* 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.02 
 
                                                 
Panel A displays the correlation coefficients between the six agency variables. Panel B displays the correlation coefficients between the five external 
monitoring variables. Finally, Panel C displays the correlation coefficients (Spearman only) for the 17 internal monitoring variables All governance variables 
are defined in Appendix C. 
1 Bolded scores denote significance at less than 0.01. 
2 Due to the large number of correlates presented, only the Spearman correlation scores are reported. Pearson correlation scores do not differ  
materially from those reported above. Bolded scores denote significance at less than 0.01. The * (^) symbols denote significance at less than 0.05 (0.10) levels, 
respectively. The reference numbers in Panel C (I1, I2, …, I17) index to the 17 inside monitoring variables as follows: (I1) BDUNAFFOUTSIDE;  
(I2) BD_SIZE; (I3) BD_MTGS; (I4) CEO_SHR; (I5) CEO_TURN; (I6) BD_UNDER4; (17) BD_NOTACTCEO; (I8) CEO_COB; (I9) FOUND_CEO;   
(I10) FOUND_BD; (I11) CEO_EBC; (I12) CEO_BONUS; (I13) POISON; (I14) STATEINC; (I15) STAGBD; (I16) SUPER; and (I17) UNEQVOTE. 
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Table 5 - Governance Principle Component Analysis (PCA) Factors and Factor Descriptive 
Statistics 
 
Panel A: PCA Factors, Factor Scores and Reliability Measures 
Variable   Factor   Components   Loadings   
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
         
AGENCY  LARGE  SIZE  0.7029  0.3971 
(2 factors) 1    OWN  0.6796   
[0.3851]  CASH  RISK  0.6878  0.3731 
    FCF  0.7115   
         
OUTSIDEMON  BLOCK  BLOCKHOLDER  0.5549  0.8548 
(2 Factors)    LRGSHRHLDR  0.4827   
[0.5889]    BLOCKPCT  0.6223   
  ACTIVIST  ACTIVIST  0.6525  0.3230 
    ACTIVISTPCT  0.7509   
         
INSIDEMON  CEOCOMP  CEO_EBC  0.7037  0.8008 
(6 Factors) 2    CEO_BONUS  -0.7036   
[0.4573]  BDANTI  STAGBD  0.6423  0.3848 
    POISON  0.6789   
  FOUND  FOUND_CEO  0.6867  0.7396 
    FOUND_BD  0.7014   
  BDQUAL  BD_UNDER4  0.6805  0.3614 
    BD_NOTACTCEO  0.5809   
  CEOPWR  CEO_COB  0.5193  0.2448 
    STATEINC  0.4558   
    CEO_TURN  0.6131   
  BDVOTE  BD_SIZE  0.7910  0.2122 
    SUPER  0.4413   
 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics – Governance Factors 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev.  Q1  Median  Q3  Min  Max 
AGENCY1  0.000  0.409  -0.282  -0.024  0.239  -1.252  1.915 
OUTSIDEMON  0.000  0.560  -0.340  0.014  0.352  -2.126  3.206 
INSIDEMON2  0.000  0.310  -0.156  0.031  0.196  -1.489  1.166 
         
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics – Governance Factors (by grouping)      
  Median Scores:          
Variable  Low/Weak  High/Strong           
AGENCY1  -0.229  0.444           
OUTSIDEMON  -0.296  0.574           
INSIDEMON2  -0.154  0.299           
 
                                                 
This table presents the results of the PCA analysis on the three sets of governance variables. Consistent with Larcker, et al. (2007) and Dey (2008), factors with an eigenvalue 
exceeding one are retained and components with a factor loading exceeding 0.40 are reported in Panel A. Components not loading significantly on a factor are considered distinct 
factors as described below (GROWTH, LEV for AGENCY and BD_UNAFFOUTIDE, BD_MTGS, CEO_SHR and UNEQVOTE for INSIDEMON). Panel A also displays the 
Cronbach’s Alpha scores for each of the separate PCA analyses. In each case, the Cronbach’s Alpha scores are lower than the benchmark of 0.70 identified in Larcker, et al. 
(2007) and Dey (2008). However, the reliability scores appear to be similar to those obtained by these authors and further I note that these low reliability scores are not unusual 
in exploratory PCA analyses such as this (Larcker et al. 2007). Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the three governance structure variables, which are calculated consistent 
with Larcker, et al. (2007) as the average of each factor’s standardized components (see notes 1 and 2 below for additional details). Panel C presents a breakdown of the median 
governance into the high/strong and low/weak binary grouping categories used in the main analyses, which are used in the analyses of investors’ perceptions of goodwill (tests of 
H2 and H4). 
1 AGENCY scores are calculated as the average standardized components comprising these two distinct factors and the standardized scores of two additional components 
(measured as the standardized variables, GROWTH and LEV).  See Panel B for additional descriptive statistics. 
2 INSIDEMON scores are calculated as the average standardized components comprising these six distinct factors and the standardized scores of four additional components 
(measured as the standardized variables, BD_UNAFFOUTSIDE, BD_MTGS, CEO_SHR and UNEQVOTE). See Panel B for additional descriptive statistics. 
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Table 6 - Regression Analysis Correlation Tables (H1 & H2) 
 
Panel A: Correlation Table – H1 Regression Variables – Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal1 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GDWL (1) - 0.219 0.046* 0.473 0.299 0.167 0.462 0.041* 0.073 
XAD (2) 0.222 - -0.128 0.321 0.384 0.180 0.249 0.004 0.142 
XRD (3) 0.022 -0.356 - 0.072 0.046 -0.058 -0.141 0.091 0.096 
INTANLG (4) 0.555 0.264 0.188 - 0.168 0.037* 0.357 -0.012 0.054 
TANA (5) 0.327 0.499 -0.128 0.127 - 0.223 0.245 -0.025 0.102 
MKTSHR (6) 0.284 0.389 -0.204 0.125 0.334 - 0.191 -0.014 -0.017 
AGENCY (7) 0.428 0.411 -0.198 0.283 0.334 0.301 - 0.047 0.023 
INSIDEMON (8) 0.041 -0.024 0.097  0.022 -0.035* -0.034^ 0.053 - 0.072 
OUTSIDEMON (9) 0.058 0.088 0.049 0.017 0.086 -0.033^ -0.005 0.080 - 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Table – H2 Regression Variable s– Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MVE (1) - 0.531 0.368 0.477 0.167 -0.032 -0.027 -0.003 
ALGDWL (2) 0.524 - 0.389 0.918 0.175 0.246 -0.016 0.052 
GDWL (3) 0.322 0.397 - 0.593 0.053 0.387 0.048* 0.025 
LIAB (4) 0.457 0.905 0.567 - 0.146 0.326 0.022 0.047* 
INC (5) 0.259 0.186 0.075 0.154 - -0.005 -0.062 -0.019 
HIGHAGENCY (6) -0.034^ 0.287 0.349 0.392 -0.040* - 0.051* -0.008 
STRINSMON (7) -0.039^ -0.025 0.040* 0.010 -0.087 0.051* - 0.043* 
STROUTMON (8) -0.013 0.020 0.008 0.002 -0.033 -0.008 0.043* - 
 
                                                 
Panel A (Panel B) presents the correlation scores for the H1 (H2) regressors. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All correlation scores are based 
on n=3,149 except for those including the INC variable (n=3,139). 
1 Bolded scores denote significance at less than 0.01. The * (^) symbols denote significance at less than 0.05 (0.10) levels, respectively 
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Table 7 - Regression Analysis Results (H1 & H2) 
 
Panel A: H1 Regression Table – Determinants of Goodwill 
GDWLi,t = α + βn,i,t x Control Variables + βm,i,t x Test Variables + ε 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Test /  Exp.  Coeff  Coeff  Coeff  Coeff 
Variable1   control   Sign   (t-Stat)   (t-Stat)   (t-Stat)   (t-Stat) 
INTERCEPT  n/a  n/a  0.240  0.330  0.461  4.991 
      (0.55)  (0.77)  (1.24)  (1.82*) 
XAD  control  +  0.578  0.639  -  - 
      (1.09)  (1.20)     
XRD  control  +  1.313  1.267  0.859  -1.517 
      (4.02***)  (3.84***)  (3.70***)  (-2.52***) 
INTANLG  control  +  1.147  1.091  1.039  0.895 
      (13.12***)  (12.44***)  (11.72***)  (5.55***) 
TANA  control  +  0.054  0.055  0.115  0.071 
      (2.16**)  (2.22**)  (8.18***)  (1.91**) 
MKTSHR  control  +  0.134  0.095  1.228  -1.103 
      (0.15)  (0.11)  (1.30*)  (-0.54) 
AGENCY  test  ?  -  1.051  1.660  8.601 
        (3.46***)  (6.81***)  (5.17***) 
INSIDEMON  test  ?  -  0.186  -0.018  0.866 
        (0.55)  (-0.08)  (0.45) 
OUTSIDEMON  test  ?  -  -0.076  0.003  0.056 
        (-0.56)  (0.02)  (0.06) 
YR05  control  n/a  -0.016  0.008  0.087  0.782 
      (-0.15)  (0.97)  (1.08)  (0.56) 
YR06  control  n/a  0.144  0.154  0.174  -1.567 
      (1.29)  (1.25)  (1.85*)  (-1.14) 
YR07  control  n/a  0.306  0.219  0.222  0.237 
      (2.07**)  (1.28)  (1.99**)  (0.17) 
Adjusted R2      0.3554  0.3687  0.3080  0.5429 
F-value      47.86  37.48  58.85  11.88 
No. of firms      1,338  1,338  3,149  190 
Industry Dummies?      No  No  No  Yes 
Fixed Effects?           Yes   Yes   Yes   No 
(Table continued on next page) 
 74
Panel B: H2 Regression Table – Investors’ Perceptions of Goodwill 
MVEi,t = α + βj,i,t x Control Variables + βk,i,t x Test Variables + ε   
        (1)  (2)  (3) 
    Test/  Predict.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
Variable1   Ref   control   Sign   (t-Stat)   (t-Stat)   (t-Stat) 
INTERCEPT  α  n/a  n/a  14.056  14.720  8.668 
        (9.18***)  (7.71***)  (1.65*) 
GDWL  β1  test  +  0.884  1. 329  1.852 
        (5.38***)  (7.71***)  (3.50***) 
ALGDWL  β2  control  +  1.473  1.426  1.190 
        (12.83***)  (12.54***)  (6.71***) 
LIAB  β3  control  -  -1.203  -1.141  -1.010 
        (-8.92***)  (-8.73***)  (-3.90***) 
INC  β4  control  +  0.791  0.713  1.151 
        (5.37***)  (5.10***)  (1.47*) 
HIGHAGENCY  β5  control  n/a  -  -4.697  -11.757 
          (-5.93***)  (-3.35***) 
STRINSMON  β6  control  n/a  -  0.241  -1.520 
          (0.33)  (-0.43) 
STROUTMON  β7  control  n/a  -  -1.383  -0.954 
          (-1.97**)  (-0.24) 
HIGHAGExGDWL  β8  test  -  -  -0.316  -0.523 
          (-2.79***)  (-1.25) 
STRIMONxGDWL  β9  test  +  -  -0.068  0.294 
          (-0.74)  (0.93) 
STROMONxGDWL  β10  test  +  -  0.053  -0.059 
          (0.62)  (-0.21) 
YR05    control  n/a  0.253  0.275  3.502 
        (0.56)  (0.63)  (1.23) 
YR06    control  n/a  1.227  1.071  3.352 
        (2.63***)  (2.33**)  (0.96) 
YR07    control  n/a  1.813  1.838  5.469 
        (3.12***)  (3.10***)  (1.66**) 
Adjusted R2        0.3434  0.3959  0.5460 
F-value        43.14  36.29  17.27 
No. of firms        3,139  3,139  189 
Industry Dummies?        No  No  Yes 
Fixed Effects?               Yes   Yes   No 
 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Panel C: H2 Regression Table – Governance Interaction Effects 
Monitor: 2 
Int. / Ext. Weak / Weak Strong / Weak Weak / Strong Strong / Strong 
( β1 ) ( β1 + β9 ) ( β1 + β10 ) ( β1 + β9 + β10 ) 
Agency = 
Low 1.33 (7.71***) 1.26 (6.71***) 1.38 (7.91***) 1.31 (7.11***) 
( β1 + β8 ) ( β1 + β8 + β9 ) ( β1 + β8 + β10 ) ( β1 + β8 + β9 + β10 ) S
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n 
(2
) 
Agency = 
High 1.01 (6.08***) 0.94 (5.14***) 1.07 (6.29***) 1.00 (5.51***) 
 
                                                 
Panel A presents the H1 regression table. The dependent variable is GDWL in each of the H1 regression 
specifications. Panel B presents the H2 regression table. The dependent variable is MVE in each of the H2 
regression specifications. Panel C presents the joint tests for specification (2) of the H2 regression analyses 
amongst the eight agency (low and high) and internal and external monitoring (weak and strong) groupings. 
 
*,**,*** Indicates significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (based on one-tailed 
tests when a sign is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). Coefficient estimates are presented for each variable 
corresponding with the distinct specification column in which they are presented and t-statistics are reported below 
in parentheses. 
 
1 Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
2 Internal (Int.) and External (Ext.) monitoring 
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Table 8 - Descriptive Statistics - Residual Goodwill Analyses 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Purchase Price Allocation and Additional Regression Variables 
Variable Mean1 Median1 Std. Dev. 
Cash Purchase Price (n=181) 1,256.2 1,075.0 2,407.2 
Equity Purchase Price (n=90) 1,426.5 0.0 6,664.5 
Total Purchase Price (TPP) 2,682.7 1,075.0 7,342.3 
BV of Assets Acquired (BVAA) 772.1 1,048.0 2,223.1 
FV of Net Tangible Assets Acquired* 534.5 670.0 3,036.8 
FV of Intangible Assets Acquired* 607.0 93.0 2,441.8 
FV of Assets Acquired (FVAA) 1,141.5 763.0 3,772.4 
FV Write-up (FVAA-BVAA) 369.4 (285.0) - 
Write-up Percentage (% of TPP)4 (13.8%) (-26.5%) - 
In-Process R&D* 83.7 0.0 359.4 
Allocated Goodwill 1,457.5 312.0 3,852.5 
Percent of Purchase Price (54.3%) (29.0%) - 
Going-Concern Goodwill (GC_GDWL)* 903.1 24.7 2,704.7 
Percentage of Allocated Goodwill (62.0%) (7.9%) - 
Synergy Goodwill (SYN_GDWL)* 237.5 23.9 591.2 
Percentage of Allocated Goodwill (16.3%) (7.7%) - 
Residual Goodwill (RESID_GDWL)* 316.9 263.4 999.4 
Percentage of Allocated Goodwill (21.7%) (84.4%) - 
 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics – Transaction-Level and Target Firm (TLTF) Control Variables 
Target/Acquisition Control Variables2 Mean Median Std. Dev. 
RESID_GDWL_S 0.003 0.022 0.199 
Days from initial announcement to close3 116.29 93 75.62 
LONGCLOSE* 0.49 0 0.50 
SAMEIND* 0.63 1 0.48 
OTH_BIDS* 0.08 0 0.28 
EQTYPP* 0.28 0 0.39 
TC_JOIN_DIR* 0.13 0 0.34 
TC_JOIN_EMP* 0.28 0 0.45 
TC_RETIRE* 0.05 0 0.22 
TC_CHAIR* 0.44 0 0.50 
 
                                                 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics relative to the purchase price allocations for the 190 transactions 
comprising the residual goodwill sample. Panel B provides the mean, median and standard deviation statistics for 
the target firm and transaction-level control variables.  
1 The statistics presented in the mean column represent the mean values for each of the variables listed at the left. 
The statistics presented in the median column are each representative of the median transaction in terms of purchase 
price and thus, they do not typically reflect the median values for each of the variables listed at the left. 
2 Variables are defined as follows: LONGCLOSE takes the value of “1” if the median days between the initial 
announcement date and closing are above the sample median values; SAMEIND is coded “1’ if the target is in the 
same two-digit SIC (industry) as the acquirer; OTH_BIDS is “1” if other bids were publicly disclosed; EQTYPP 
represents the ratio of purchase price consideration that is equity-based; TC_JOIN_DIR (TC_JOIN_EMP) are coded 
“1” if the target CEO joins the acquiring firm as a director (employee); TC_RETIRE is coded “1” if the target CEO 
retires upon the closing of the M&A transaction; and (TC_CHAIR) is coded “1” if the target firm CEO is also the 
chair.  
3 This row presents the mean/median/standard deviation time (in days) between the initial M&A transaction 
announcement and the corresponding close date. 
4 The book value of assets acquired (BVAA) exceeds the fair value of assets acquired (FVAA) in 68 transactions. I 
run a limited sensitivity analyses by dropping these firms and reperforming the subsequent H3 and H4 tests and 
obtain results that are qualitatively similar, but weaker. It is likely that different motives may underlie these 
transactions where the write up percentage is negative and thus, these M&A transactions highlight an interesting 
area for future research. 
* Variable is included in one or more of the residual goodwill analyses (H3 and H4). 
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Table 9 - Regression Analyses Correlation Tables (H3 & H4) 
 
Panel A: Correlation Table – H3 Regression Variables – Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal1 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
RESID_GDWL (1) - 0.26 0.32 -0.07 0.41 0.40 -0.10 0.33 0.10 0.10 
SYN_GDWL (2) -0.18* - 0.38 -0.03 0.61 0.07 0.05 0.26 0.09 0.13^ 
GC_GDWL (3) 0.50 0.14^ - 0.05 0.47 -0.04 -0.07 0.43 0.02 -0.02 
PURCH_IPRD (4) -0.21 -0.16* -0.05 - 0.04 0.01 -0.14^ 0.05 -0.08 0.16* 
PURCH_INTAN (5) 0.38 0.23 0.60 0.02 - -0.21 0.04 0.25 -0.00 0.12^ 
PURCH_NA (6) 0.22 0.24 0.09 -0.03 -0.08 - -0.19 0.17* 0.13^ 0.02 
MKTSHR (7) -0.19^ 0.12 0.00 -0.17* 0.02 -0.26 - 0.07 0.02 -0.10 
AGENCY (8) 0.22 0.32 0.32 -0.23 0.22 0.14^ 0.13^ - 0.09 -0.08 
INSIDEMON (9) 0.11  0.13^ 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.10 - -0.06 
OUTSIDEMON (10) 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.14^ -0.20 -0.11 -0.05 - 
 
Panel B: Correlation Table – H4 Regression Variables – Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal1 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
MVE2 (1) - 0.03 0.15* 0.32 0.17* 0.54 0.45 0.12 -0.09 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.03 
RESID_GDWL (2) -0.03 - 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.29 0.49 -0.02 0.23 0.04 0.02 0.95 0.69 0.62 
GC_GDWL (3) 0.13^ 0.50 - 0.38 0.27 0.17* 0.35 0.04 0.31 -0.05 -0.12 0.33 0.15* 0.01 
SYN_GDWL (4) 0.07 -0.18* 0.14* - 0.10 0.52 0.61  0.02 0.21 0.06 0.07 0.26 0.31 0.04 
OTH_GDWL (5) 0.30 0.02 0.24 0.18* - 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.37 0.05 -0.07 0.28 0.15* 0.02 
ALGDWL (6) 0.61 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.32 - 0.91 0.09 0.20 0.01 0.16* 0.28 0.24 0.14^ 
LIAB (7) 0.53 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.45 0.93 - 0.05 0.27 0.00 0.11 0.48 0.39 0.23 
UI (8) 0.28 -0.02 0.01 0.12  0.13^ 0.19 0.13^ - -0.02 -0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 
HIGHAGENCY (9) -0.07  0.17* 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.38 -0.03 - 0.12^ -0.18* 0.33 0.16* 0.05 
STRINSMON (10) -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.13^ 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.12^ - -0.14* 0.03 0.30 -0.05 
STROUTMON (11) 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 0.02 -0.04 0.11 0.06 0.01 -0.18* -0.14^ - -0.03 -0.06 0.30 
HIGHAGExR_GDWL (12) -0.04 0.64 0.43 0.11^ 0.20 0.28 0.38 -0.04 0.70 0.05  -0.18* - 0.63 0.55 
STRIMONxR_GDWL (13) -0.03 0.50 0.21 0.03 -0.00 0.09 0.13^ -0.15 0.09 0.70 -0.12 0.34 - 0.10 
STROMONxR_GDWL (14) -0.03 0.35 0.04 -0.11 -0.12^ 0.12^ 0.11 -0.03 -0.15 -0.09 0.71 0.02 0.07 - 
 
                                                 
Panel A (Panel B) presents the correlation scores for the H3 (H4) regressors. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All correlation scores are based on n=190 except 
for those including the INC variable (n=189). 
1 Bolded scores denote significance at less than 0.01. The * (^) symbols denote significance at less than 0.05 (0.10) levels, respectively 
 79
Table 10 - Regression Analyses Results (H3 & H4) 
 
Panel A: H3 Regression Table – Determinants of Residual Goodwill (Acquisition-Level Analysis) 
RESID_GDWLj,t = α + βn,i,t x Control Variables + βm,i,t x Test Variables + ε   
      (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 Test/ Predict. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  
Variable1 Control Sign (t-Stat) (t-Stat) (t-Stat) (t-Stat)  
INTERCEPT n/a n/a 0.040 -0.089 0.007 0.017  
   (0.05) (-0.11) (0.08) (0.19)  
SYN_GDWL control ? -0.228 -0.211 - -  
   (-1.12) (-1.03)    
GC_GDWL control ? 0.089 0.076 - -  
   (1.21) (0.91)    
MKTSHR control + -0.536 -0.851 - -  
   (-0.85) (-1.28)    
AGENCY test ? 0.756 0.662 0.089 0.115  
   (1.57) (1.20) (2.25**) (2.92***)  
INSIDEMON test ? 0.203 0.249 0.024 0.015  
   (0.41) (0.52) (0.37) (0.22)  
OUTSIDEMON test ? 0.474 0.591 -0.034 -0.034  
   (1.55) (1.71*) (-1.27) (-1.27)  
PURCH_IPRD control - -0.699 -0.796 - -  
   (-2.64***) (-2.67***)    
PURCH_INTAN control + 0.361 0.356 - -  
   (2.22**) (2.09**)    
PURCH_NA control + 0.275 0.274 - -  
   (2.64***) (2.84***)    
SAMEIND control - - -0.346 - -0.051  
    (-1.68**)  (-1.63*)  
LONGCLOSE control ? - 0.266 - -0.007  
    (0.68)  (-0.24)  
OTH_BIDS control ? - 0.430 - -0.031  
    (0.63)  (-0.71)  
EQTYPP control ? - 0.023 - 0.096  
    (0.07)  (2.29**)  
TC_JOIN_DIR control ? - 0.251 - -0.062  
    (0.55)  (-1.44)  
TC_JOIN_EMP control ? - 0.443 - 0.026  
    (1.64)  (0.76)  
TC_RETIRE control ? - 1.165 - -0.165  
    (1.69*)  (-2.03**)  
TC_CHAIR control ? - -0.036 - 0.006  
    (-0.12)  (0.21)  
YR05 control n/a -0.059 -0.078 -0.007 0.024  
   (-0.13) (-0.15) (-0.16) (0.58)  
YR06 control n/a -0.394 -0.394 -0.036 -0.009  
   (-0.98) (-0.88) (-0.83) (-0.22)  
YR07 control n/a -0.124 0.024 -0.035 -0.015  
   (-0.41) (0.07) (-0.88) (-0.38)  
Adjusted R2   0.5223 0.5402 0.1917 0.2515  
F-value   6.42 4.79 3.08 2.84  
No. of firms   190 190 185 185  
Industry Dummies?   Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Fixed Effects?     No No No No  
(Table continued on next page) 
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Panel B: H4 Regression Table – Investors’ Perceptions of Residual Goodwill 
MVEi,t = α + βj,i,t x Control Variables + βk,i,t x Test Variables + ε 
       (1) (2) (3) 
    Test/  Predict. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Variable1   Ref   control   Sign (t-Stat) (t-Stat) (t-Stat) 
INTERCEPT  α  n/a  n/a 6.983 10.040 10.436 
       (1.33) (1.91*) (1.89*) 
RESID_GDWL_H  β1  test  - -0.617 0.769 0.771 
       (-0.77) (0.29) (0.30) 
SYN_GDWL  β3  control  + 0.845 1.042 1.633 
       (0.72) (1.09) (1.78**) 
GC_GDWL  β2  control  + 0.815 1.405 1.549 
       (1.52*) (2.64***) (2.81***) 
OTH_GDWL  β4  control  + 0.793 1.434 1.398 
       (2.33**) (5.35***) (5.16***) 
ALGDWL  β5  control  + 1.153 1.265 1.324 
       (5.33***) (6.77***) (6.56***) 
LIAB  β 6  control  - -0.781 -0.912 -1.046 
       (-2.76***) (-3.46***) (-3.71***) 
INC  β 7  control  + 1.437 0.846 0.738 
       (1.31*) (0.95) (0.83) 
HIGHAGENCY  β 8  control  n/a - -12.533 -11.520 
        (-4.23***) (-3.95***) 
STRINSMON  β 9  control  n/a - -1.290 -1.750 
        (-0.44) (-0.57) 
STROUTMON  β10  control  n/a - -5.792 -4.552 
        (-1.80) (-1.37) 
HIGHAGExR_GDWL  β11  test  - - -3.746 -3.561 
        (-1.45*) (-1.55*) 
STRIMONxR_GDWL  β12  test  + - 1.848 1.862 
        (1.19) (1.27) 
STROMONxR_GDWL  Β13  test  + - 2.996 3.010 
        (2.00**) (2.20**) 
YR05  Β14  control  n/a 5.185 4.818 3.037 
       (0.92) (1.60) (0.95) 
YR06  Β15  control  n/a 0.759 4.032 2.093 
       (0.21) (1.19) (0.60) 
YR07  β16  control  n/a 3.810 3.935 2.155 
       (1.17) (1.09) (0.56) 
Adjusted R2       0.4853 0.5838 0.6110 
F-value       8.20 11.12 9.97 
No. of firms       189 189 189 
Industry Dummies?     Yes Yes Yes 
Acquisition/Target Controls?     No No Yes 
Fixed Effects?             No No No 
 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Panel C: H4 Regression Table – Governance Interaction Effects 
Monitor: 2 
Int. / Ext. Weak / Weak Strong / Weak Weak / Strong Strong / Strong 
( β1 ) ( β1 + β12 ) ( β1 + β13 ) ( β1 + β12 + β13 ) Agency = 
Low 0.77 (0.30) 2.62 (1.00) 3.58 (1.41) 5.61 (1.68*) 
( β1 + β11 ) ( β1 + β11 + β12 ) ( β1 + β11 + β13 ) ( β1 + β11 + β12 + β13 ) 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
2
)
 
Agency = 
High -2.98 (-1.94*) -1.13 (-1.53) 0.02 (0.03) 1.87 (1.14) 
 
Monitor: 2 
Int. / Ext. Weak / Weak Strong / Weak Weak / Strong Strong / Strong 
( β1 ) ( β1 + β12 ) ( β1 + β13 ) ( β1 + β12 + β13 ) Agency = 
Low 0.77 (0.29) 2.63 (1.13) 3.77 (1.39) 5.73 (1.97**) 
( β1 + β11 ) ( β1 + β11 + β12 ) ( β1 + β11 + β13 ) ( β1 + β11 + β12 + β13 ) 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
3
)
 
Agency = 
High -2.79 (-2.00**) -0.93 (-1.24) 0.31 (0.49) 2.17 (1.33) 
 
                                                 
Panel A presents the H3 regression table. The dependent variable is RESID_GDWL_H in specifications (1) and (2) and RESID_GDWL_S in specifications (3) 
and (4). Panel B presents the H4 regression table. The dependent variable is MVE2 in each of the H4 regression specifications. Panel C presents the joint tests 
for specifications (2) and (3) of the H4 regression analyses amongst the eight agency (low and high) and internal and external monitoring (weak and strong) 
groupings. 
 
*,**,*** Indicates significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests when a sign is predicted, two-tailed 
otherwise). Coefficient estimates are presented for each variable corresponding with the distinct specification column in which they are presented and t-statistics 
are reported below in parentheses. 
 
1 Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
2 Internal (Int.) and External (Ext.) monitoring 
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APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS (FINANCIAL VARIABLES) 
 
# Mnemonic Variable Name Cite Source Variable Definition 
1 GDWL Goodwill Various 
Compustat 
(CS) Total goodwill 
2 MVE 
Market Value of 
Equity Various CS 
Market value of equity at 
year-end 
3 MVE2 
Market Value of 
Equity 
(Alternate) 
Modification 
of Henning, 
et al. (2000) 
CRSP & 
Hand-
Collected 
Market value of equity 90 
days (one quarter) after 
the initial purchase price 
allocation in annual 10-K 
filing. 
4 
RESID_ 
GDWL_H 
Residual 
Goodwill 
Henning, et 
al. (2000) 
CRSP & 
Hand- 
Collected 
Excess of purchased 
goodwill over (1) going 
concern and (2) 
synergistic goodwill. 
5 GC_GDWL 
Going Concern 
GW 
Henning, et 
al. (2000) 
CRSP & 
Hand- 
Collected 
Difference between the 
FV of assets recognized 
and the pre-acquisition 
market value of the target 
firm. 
6 SYN_GDWL Synergistic GW 
Henning, et 
al. (2000) 
CRSP & 
Hand- 
Collected 
Bradley, et al.'s (1988) 
measure represented as 
the combined CAR for 
both the target AND 
acquiring firms in the 11-
day window centered on 
the acquisition 
announcement. 
7 
RESID_ 
GDWL_S 
Residual 
Goodwill 2 
Shalev 
(2009) Various 
Residuals from regression 
of the proportion of 
goodwill allocated to the 
total purchase price on 
the following three 
variables: (1) acquiring 
firm industry; (2) target 
firm industry; (3) median 
analyst long-term growth 
forecast for the acquiring 
firm. 
8 XAD Advertising 
Chauvin and 
Hirschey 
(1994) CS Advertising expenditures 
9 XRD 
Research & 
Development 
Chauvin and 
Hirschey 
(1994) CS 
Research & Development 
expenditures 
10 INTANLG 
Intangible 
Assets 
Chauvin and 
Hirschey 
(1994) CS 
 
Total intangible assets 
less total goodwill 
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11 TANA Tangible Assets 
Chauvin and 
Hirschey 
(1994) CS 
Total assets less total 
intangible assets 
12 MKTSHR Market Share 
Chauvin and 
Hirschey 
(1994) CS 
Total firm-level sales 
revenue divided by total 
industry sales (where 
industry sales are 
aggregated by 4-digit SIC 
code for the population of 
CS firms for a given 
year) 
13 ALGDWL 
Assets Less 
Goodwill 
McCarthy, 
et al (1995) CS 
Total assets less total 
goodwill 
14 INC 
Unexpected 
Net Income 
McCarthy, 
et al (1995) CS 
Change in net income 
from PY net income 
15 OTH_GDWL Other goodwill This study 
CS & Hand 
Collected 
Equal to the goodwill not 
corresponding with the 
selected residual goodwill 
sample acquisition, 
calculated as the total 
goodwill at year-end less 
the goodwill allocated in 
the acquisition. 
16 LIAB Total Liabilities 
McCarthy, 
et al (1995) CS Total liabilities 
17 
AGENCY / 
HIGHAGENCY 
Agency 
Conflicts Dey (2008) 
Various – 
See Below 
Variable(s) proxying for 
the presence of potential 
agency conflicts based on 
PCA performed on the 
following six variables: 
SIZE, LEV, OWN, 
RISK, GROWTH and 
FCF (defined below). 
18 
INSIDEMON / 
STRINSMON 
Strength of 
Internal 
Monitoring 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
Dey (2008), 
Larcker, et 
al (2007) & 
Gillan 
(2006) 
See 
Appendix C 
Variable(s) proxying for 
the strength of a firm's 
governance mechanisms 
based on PCA performed 
over seventeen internal 
governance mechanisms 
described in Appendix C 
19 
OUTSIDEMON/ 
STROUTMON 
Strength of 
Internal 
Monitoring 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
Dey (2008), 
Larcker, et 
al (2007) & 
Gillan 
(2006) 
See 
Appendix C 
Variable(s) proxying for 
the strength of a firm's 
governance mechanisms 
based on PCA performed 
over five external 
governance mechanisms 
described in Appendix C 
20 SIZE Size Dey (2008) CS 
Natural log of annual 
sales 
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21 LEV Leverage Dey (2008) CS 
Long-term debt divided 
by total assets 
22 OWN Ownership Dey (2008) 
The 
Corporate 
Library 
(TCL) 
1 - (Value of shares held 
by directors, executive 
officers and listed 
institutional shareholders) 
/ market value of equity 
23 RISK Risk Dey (2008) CS 
Standard deviation of 
operating cash flows 
from the previous four 
quarters. 
24 GROWTH Growth Dey (2008) CS Book-to-market ratio  
25 FCF Free Cash Flow Dey (2008) CS 
 Difference between cash 
flow from operations for 
the previous quarter and 
the previous three quarter 
average of capital 
expenditures all scaled by 
current assets. 
26 PURCH_IPRD 
In-process R&D 
acquired This study 
Hand 
Collected 
Represents the dollar 
amount allocated to in-
process R&D in the 
purchase price allocation. 
27 PURCH_INTAN 
Intangible assets 
acquired This study 
Hand 
Collected 
Represents the dollar 
amount allocated to 
intangible assets in the 
purchase price allocation. 
28 PURCH_NA 
Tangible assets 
acquired This study 
Hand 
Collected 
Represents the dollar 
amount allocated to net 
assets (tangible assets 
less liabilities) in the 
purchase price allocation. 
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APPENDIX C: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS (GOVERNANCE VARIABLES) 
 
# Category 
Variable 
Description Source Mnemonic 
Variable 
Definition 
1 Internal 
Independent 
Directors 
The 
Corporate 
Library 
(TCL) BD_UNAFFOUTSIDE
Percent of 
unaffiliated outside 
directors 
2 Internal Board Size TCL BD_SIZE 
Total number of 
directors multiplied 
by negative one (-1) 
3 Internal 
Busy Directors 
– Other 
Directorships TCL BD_UNDER4 
Percent of directors 
with fewer than 
four outside 
directorships 
4 Internal 
Busy Directors 
– Active CEOs TCL BD_NOTACTCEO 
Percent of directors 
that are not acting 
CEOs 
5 Internal 
Number of 
Board Meetings TCL BD_MTGS 
Total number of 
board meetings 
6 Internal Dual CEO/Chair TCL CEO_COB 
Coded "1" if the 
CEO is NOT also 
the board's chair, 
otherwise "0" 
7 Internal Founding CEO TCL FOUND_CEO 
Coded "1" if the 
CEO is NOT also 
the company's 
founder, otherwise 
"0" 
8 Internal 
Founder on 
Board TCL FOUND_BD 
Coded "1" if the 
company's founder 
is NOT a board 
member, otherwise 
"0" 
9 Internal 
Executive 
Turnover TCL CEO_TURN 
Coded “1” if there 
is CEO turnover 
during the four-year 
sample period. 
12 Internal 
Executive Stock 
Ownership TCL CEO_SHR 
Coded “1” if the 
CEO holds less than 
5% or greater than 
25% of outstanding 
stock of the 
company. 
10 Internal 
Executive 
Bonus Pay ExecuComp CEO_BONUS 
Yearly bonus 
compensation 
divided by total 
annual 
compensation 
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11 Internal 
Executive 
Equity-based 
Compensation 
(EBC) ExecuComp CEO_EBC 
Calculated as: (total 
annual 
compensation less 
salary, bonus, and 
other 
compensation) 
divided by total 
annual 
compensation 
13 Internal Staggered Board 
RiskMetrics 
(IRRC) STAGBD 
Coded "1" if the 
company does NOT 
have a staggered 
board; otherwise 
"0" 
14 Internal 
Supermajority 
Vote IRRC SUPER 
Coded "1" if the 
company does NOT 
have a 
supermajority 
voting provision; 
otherwise "0" 
15 Internal Unequal Voting IRRC UNEQVOTE 
Coded "1" if the 
company does NOT 
have unequal voting 
rights across its 
share classes; 
otherwise "0" 
16 Internal 
State 
Incorporated IRRC STATEINC 
Coded "1" if the 
company is NOT 
based in PA, OH, 
MA, or WI – states 
with greater 
protections for 
incumbent 
managers. 
17 Internal 
Poison Pill 
Provisions IRRC POISON 
Coded "1" if the 
company does NOT 
have a poison pill 
provision. 
1 External 
Percent of 
Shares Held by 
Blockholders 
Thomson 
Research 
(Spectrum) BLOCKPCT 
Percent of shares 
held by 
blockholders 
2 External 
Number of 
Blockholders Spectrum BLOCKHOLDER 
Total number of 
blockholders 
3 External 
Percent of 
Shares Held by 
Largest 
Blockholder Spectrum LRGSHRHLDR 
Percent of shares 
held by the single 
largest unaffiliated 
shareholder 
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4 External 
Number of 
Activists Spectrum ACTIVIST 
Total number of 
activist institutions 
holding shares 
5 External 
Percent of 
Shares Held by 
Activists Spectrum ACTIVISTPCT 
Percent of shares 
held by activist 
institutions 
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